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ABSTRACT 
For the past 16 years racial and ethnic minorities, and, to a lesser extent, women, have 
been targeted by several Federal Communications Commission policies designed to increase the 
number of broadcasting stations owned by members of those groups. The FCC, prodded by 
judicial decisions, claims that by increasing the diversity of ownership of the airwaves it will 
increase the diversity of programming content. Hence, these policies -- termed "minority 
preference policies" -- are justified as a method of controlling broadcasting content. Congress 
is intensely interested in protecting these policies, while litigants are attacking the policies' 
constitutionality in the courts. 
This article appraises the justification for the minority preference policies -- the 
purported connection between a broadcast station owner's race or sex and the owner's 
programming decisions. Do white males really program differently than Black, Hispanic, 
Asian/Pacific Islander, Alaskan/ American Indian, or female owners? If so, when, and in what 
ways is this likely to be true? 
In this article I will outline the content of the minority preference policies, pausing only 
briefly to review their hist<>ry. Then I will present a basic model of programming choice by 
profit-maximizing broadcasters, and modify it to incorporate the race and sex of the broadcast 
station owner. This theory will provide two possible reasons that minority or female owners 
might choose to program differently than white males. Minority or female owners might give 
up some profits to satisfy a taste for specialized programming. Alternatively, minority or 
female owners might have a cost advantage at broadcasting programming targeted to their own 
groups. Next, I will review the data on the connection between ownership characteristics and 
programming choice. This data most likely supports the two possible reasons for minority and 
female owners programming differently than white males, but the data cannot give any hint of 
how strong these differences might be, nor can it completely rule out the possibility that 
there is no difference in programming choices between different types of owners. Last, I will 
show how the theory and evidence may play a role in the justification of the minority 
preference policies in the post Richmond v. J.A. Croson world of constitutional adjudication. 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal Communications Commission policies attempt to increase the number of 
broadcasting stations owned by racial and ethnic minorities, and, to a lesser extent, women. 
The FCC, prodded by early decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeal for the District of 
Columbia, 1 claims that by increasing the diversity of ownership of the airwaves it will 
increase the diversity of programming content. Hence, these policies -- termed "minority 
preference policies" -- are justified as a method of controlling broadcasting content. Congress 
protects these policies, while litigants attack the policies' constitutionality in the courts. In 
March, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued 
two decisions, one striking down one of the minority preference policies2, and the other 
decision upholding another minority preference policy.3 The Supreme Court will review these 
decisions. 4
In this article I will concentrate on the justification for the minority preference policies 
the purported connection between a broadcast station owner's race or sex and the owner's 
programming decisions. Do white males really program differently than Black, Hispanic, 
Asian/Pacific Islander, Alaskan/ American Indian, or female owners? If so, when, and in what 
ways is this likely to be true?5 
Before I begin answering these questions, however, I should highlight the nature of my 
enterprise. The FCC justifies the minority preference policies on the theory that minority 
owners and female owners will program a different mix of material than will white male 
owners. This immediately raises two questions. First, why not just require broadcasters, 
regardless of race or sex, to program the special material that the FCC hopes that minority 
and female owners will choose to put on the air? This would avoid the need for explicit 
racial classifications in the law. Second, why not justify the minority preference policies 
directly on the ground that minorities and women have been victims of past discrimination, 
and that these policies remedy past discrimination? This would avoid the need to show a 
relationship between owners' ethnic or sexual characteristics and programming choice. For the 
purposes of this article, I will assume that neither question can help us avoid the basic 
inquiry in this Article. First, directly requiring broadcasters to program special material runs 
afoul, I will presume, of either the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and 
press6, or of the Communication Act's prohibition of censorship. 7 Second, in the disputes that 
have reached the Supreme Court the minority preference policies cannot be justified as 
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remedial measures simply because neither the Commission nor Congress has ever claimed this 
to be so. As a result, neither the FCC nor Congress has developed a factual record that 
might support the remedial claim.8 Because I presume that the FCC cannot directly require 
minority programming, and because the FCC cannot now claim that the minority preference 
policies are remedial, I must investigate the relationship between female or minority ownership 
and programming.9 
My investigation of the relationship between female or minority ownership and 
programming will nru ascertain whether or not there is enough evidence to satisfy a skeptical 
social scientist of the relationship. (I strongly suspect that there is not.) Instead, I will 
evaluate the theory and evidence of program choice against the background of legal standards 
for upholding explicit racial classifications. 
In this article I will outline the content of the minority preference policies, pausing only 
briefly to review their history. Then I will present a basic model of programming choice by 
profit-maximizing broadcasters, and modify it to incorporate the race and sex of the broadcast 
station owner. This theory will provide two possible reasons that minority or female owners 
might choose to program differently than white males.10 Minority or female owners might 
give up some profits to satisfy a taste for specialized programming. Alternatively, minority or 
female owners might have a cost advantage at broadcasting programming targeted to their own 
groups. Next, I will review the data on the connection between ownership characteristics and 
programming choice. This data most likely supports the two possible reasons for minority and 
female owners programming differently than white males, but the data cannot give any hint of 
how strong these differences might be, nor can it completely rule out the possibility that 
there is no difference in programming choices between different types of owners. Last, I will 
show how the theory and evidence may play a role in the justification of the minority 
preference policies in the post Richmond v. J.A. Croson11 world of constitutional adjudication. 
I. THE MINORITY PREFERENCE POLICIES 
Every broadcaster in the United States of America must have a license from the FCC.12 
A broadcast license lasts for seven years in radio and for five years in television, and must be 
renewed at the time of expiration for a broadcaster to continue broadcasting.13 There are 
two basic methods of obtaining a broadcast license, direct grant from the FCC or purchase 
from an existing licensee. The FCC grants licenses two different ways. First, it awards radio 
and television licenses to applicants after holding comparative hearings. According to the 
basic theory, when several applicants ask the FCC for the same license, 14 the FCC compares 
several relevant characteristics of the applicants, combines the comparisons within each of the 
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characteristics into an overall evaluation of which broadcaster would best serve the "public 
interest", and then awards the license to the best applicant.15 Some of these areas of
comparison, sometimes known as comparative criteria, include diversification of ownership of 
mass media, integration of ownership with management, and technical virtuosity.16 Second, 
the FCC grants certain types of licenses, particularly low power television licenses, by lottery. 
Sales of broadcasting licenses usually generate far less administrative process. Buyers 
and sellers are usually introduced through brokers17, and the FCC is precluded by statute
from considering anyone other than the proposed buyer when passing on the sale. As long as 
the new owner seems acceptable, the FCC must approve.18 The FCC enforces four minority
preference policies. Two of them -- the minority and female merit in comparative hearings 
and the lottery preference -- apply to FCC license grants. The other two -- the distress sale 
and the tax certificate -- apply to license sales. 
A. MINORITY AND FEMALE MERIT IN COMPARATIVE HEARINGS 
Any datum suggesting that one of several applicants for a broadcasting license should be 
preferred under a particular criterion used in the comparative hearing will be termed an 
"enhancement"19 or a "merit."20 Prompted by the TV9 case21, the FCC awards a merit under
the diversification of ownership criterion to any applicant, a substantial percentage of which 
is owned by one or more minorities. In TV9 the FCC had attempted to assert that the 
Federal Communications Act is "colorblind," and offered to take an applicant's race into 
account only to the extent that the applicant could show that his race would likely lead to 
better, more diverse programming in the particular case. The DC Circuit reversed, essentially 
requiring the FCC to award a merit to any minority applicant without the need for any 
demonstration that the award would improve programming service in the particular case. 22 
The FCC not only complied with the TV9 ruling, but just four years later extended it to 
women.28 However, the FCC decided to extend "a merit of lesser significance"24 because
women, unlike racial minorities, had not been "excluded from the mainstream of society" due 
to prior discrimination. 25 Just as in TV9 the FCC required no proof of connection between 
female ownership and diversity in program content. 
B. TAX CERTIFICATES 
In 1978 the FCC adopted two policies designed to stimulate the sale of broadcasting 
stations to minorities because "[f]ull minority participation in the ownership and management 
of broadcast facilities results in a more diverse selection of programming."26 The first such 
policy called for the FCC to issue special tax certificates when a station is sold to "parties 
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with a significant minority interest. "27 A tax certificate would allow the seller to defer any 
capital gain tax on the sale, thereby giving the seller a substantial incentive to seek out 
qualified minority buyers, and accept offers from minority buyers even where the minorities 
offer slightly less money than prospective white purchasers. 
The FCC reports that it has issued 178 tax certificates since the inception of the 
program, and that the rate of use of the program has been growing quickly. 28 The Los 
Angeles Times reports that Geraldo Rivera and four partners are spending hundreds of millions 
of dollars to assemble a new broadcast network utilizing tax certificates. 29 
The same year that the FCC adopted the tax certificate policy (and the distress sale 
policy, discussed below) for minorities, it refused to extend either policy to women. In a 
moderately surprising change of position, the FCC stated "while receptive to factual showings 
in specific cases which indicate a need for preferential incentives to encourage female 
involvement/ownership, we have not concluded that the historical and contemporary disad­
vantagement suffered by women is of the same order, or has the same contemporary 
consequences, which would justify inclusion of a majority of the nation's population in a 
preferential category defined by the presence of 'minority groups. '"30 
C. DISTRESS SALES 
When the FCC announced the tax certificate policy it also announced the distress sale 
policy. Under that policy the FCC offered to approve the transfer of any license that had 
been designated for revocation hearing, or for renewal hearing on basic qualification issues, if 
the buyer was a minority who purchased the station before the start of the hearing, and paid 
no more than 7 5% of fair market value. 31 The purchaser could apparently take the license 
free of the taint that occasioned the hearing. Such a policy obviously gives licensees in 
trouble an incentive to seek out minority purchasers. The price ceiling of 75% of fair market 
value gives minority purchasers an incentive to seek out licenses in trouble. The FCC reports 
that the distress sale policy has been used less than 40 times since its inception, far fewer 
times than the tax certificate po!icy. 32 As I indicated in the paragraph above, the FCC has 
refused to extend the distress sale policy to female purchasers. 
D. LOTTERY PREFERENCES 
In 1981 Congress amended section 309(i) of the Federal Communications Act to allow the 
award of broadcast licenses by lottery .33 The statute gave discretion to the FCC to use a 
lottery and directed FCC to " . . .  establish rules and procedures to ensure that, in the ad­
ministration of any system of random selection under this subsection, groups or organizations, 
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or members of groups or organizations, which are underrepresented in the ownership of 
telecommunications facilities or properties will be granted significant prefernces." The 
Conference Report accompanying the bill provided "it is the firm intention of the conferees 
that ownership by minorities, such as Blacks and hispanics, as well as by women, and owner­
ship by other underrepresented groups, such as labor unions and community organizations, is 
to be encouraged through the award of significant preferences in any such random selection 
proceeding. These are groups which are inadequately represented in terms of nationwide 
telecommunications ownership, and it is the intention of the conferees in establishing a 
random selection process that the objective of increasing the number of media outlets owned 
by such persons or groups be met. "34 
The FCC refused to implement any such scheme, claiming that it was too vague, and 
requested Congress to provide a new, more specific mandate. In J 982 Congress responded by 
passing new subsection 309(i)(3)(C)(ii) which provides "[t]he term 'minority group' includes 
Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, Alaska Natives, Asians, and Pacific Islanders." In 
addition, Congress amended 309(i)(3)(A) to direct that " . . .  significant preferences will be 
granted to applications or groups of applications, the grant to which of the license or permit 
would increase the diversification of ownership of the media of mass communications. To 
further diversify the ownership of the media of mass communications, an additional significant 
preference shall be granted to any applicant controlled by a member or members of a minority 
group."35 
The FCC granted lottery preferences to the listed groups, plus those owning no or very 
few other media interests, 36 and then, after a quite divisive rulemaking proceeding37, decided
not to give lottery preferences to women. 38 
E. COURT CHALLENGES AND SUBSEQUENT HISTORY 
!. West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C. 
In 1984 the D.C. Circuit affirmed the legality of the minority preference in comparative 
hearings in West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v.F.C.C..89 Two applicants, West Michigan Broad­
casting and Waters, clashed over the award of an FM radio station in Hart, Michigan, a 
community with no significant Black population. Waters, wholly owned by a Black woman, was 
granted the license, partly because of an enhancement for the owner's race. West Michigan 
appealed, claiming that the enhancement was illegal under the Federal Communications Act and 
under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. J. Skelly Wright, 
writing for a unanimous court, turned aside both challenges. The enhancement in a compara­
tive hearing was lawful because the FCC is to be guided by the "public interest" standard 
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embedded within the Federal Communications Act of 1934, and part of the public interest 
includes ensuring a diverse set of program offerings to the public. The TV9 decision from 10 
years before should be interpreted, said the court, to require the FCC to assume that Black 
owners will present distinctive programming40, and that such programming is valuable not only
to satisfy the preferences of Black audiences, but also to expose others to new points of view 
and ideas.41 The Constitutional attack was turned away largely on the strength of two
Supreme Court decisions, Fullilove v. Klutznick,42 and University of California Regents v.
Bakke, 43 that will be discussed at greater length later in this article.
2. Steele v. F.C.C. and the Aftermath 
In I 985 The D.C. Circuit first held unlawful the female preference in comparative 
hearings in Steele v. F.C.C.44, and then vacated the Steele opinion and remanded the case,
along with others, to the FCC. The Steele opinion stated that minority and female 
preferences rested on two assumptions: 1) minority and female owners have different tastes 
and preferences than do white males; and 2) these tastes and preferences are manifested in 
the programming choices of minority and female owners. 45 The opinion regarded the first
assumption as stereotyping, and the second as empirically unlikely, because programming 
decisions are more likely profit-driven rather than preference-driven.46 Whereas the D.C.
Circuit was willing to swallow these assumptions in the case of minority preferences, it was 
not willing to do so for female preferences. 
In any event, after the D.C. Circuit granted rehearing en bane in Steele, the FCC 
changed its position and indicated that it no longer supported the minority and female 
preferences.47 The D.C. Circuit then remanded Steele, along with two other cases, back to
the FCC for reconsideration and for further investigation of the factual predicates for the 
minority and female preferences in comparative hearings. The FCC put out a notice that it 
was rethinking the entire area48 and also mailed detailed questionnaires to licensees,
requesting answers to questions on the relationship between ownership characteristics and 
programming content. 
The FCC got approximately a 79% response rate to its questions, but before it could do 
anything with them, or with the entire inquiry into minority and female preferences, Congress 
passed House Joint Resolution 395, terminating the inquiry and directing the FCC to use the 
preferences. 49 As a result, the FCC terminated its inquiry, reinstated the licensing decisions
in favor of the minority and female licensees in the remanded cases, so and delivered the 
returned questionnaires to the Congressional Research Service for analysis. The Congressional 
Research Service has since issued a report that claims to find some support for the connection 
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between ownership characteristics and programming choices. And two of the cases that were 
remanded to the FCC during the Steele proceedings found their way back to the D.C. Circuit, 
which issued decisions in March, 1 989, finding the distress sale policy unconstitutional and the 
minority preferences in comparative hearings constitutional. Each decision has more than one 
opinion containing heated disgreements between the empanelled judges, and one of the main 
points of contention is the relationship between minority and female ownership and 
programming choices. 51 The Supreme Court has decided to review both cases.52 Hence, a
legal storm is brewing over minority preference policies, and the relationship between 
ownership characteristics and programming choices seems to be a major part of it. 
II. A SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH TO DETECTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
OTHERS' CHARACTERISTICS AND PROGRAMMING CHOICES 
This section will present the theory of program choices by profit maximizing owners in 
broadcasting markets, and then modify that theory to take into account the race or sex of a 
broadcast station owner. Then I will evaluate the few studies of the connection between 
owners' characteristics and programming choices against the theoretical background I have 
developed. I will put off for section III an investigation of the legal doctrines under which 
this investigation might (or might not) play a crucial role. 
A. BASIC THEORY OF PROGRAM CHOICE BY RATIONAL PROFIT MAXIMIZERS 
This section will investigate the basic theory of program choice by profit maximizing 
owners, paying special attention to how and under what cirumstances such owners will choose 
to present minority-interest programming, rather than mass appeal fare. The theoretical 
literature has two parallel (and for my purposes quite similar) lines of analysis of the question 
of broadcast programming. One set of articles, stemming from Steiner's paper "Program 
Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of Competition In Radio Broadcasting,"53 models
radio broadcasting as a game between broadcasters who are interested in gaining large 
audiences.54 We will spend a substantial amount of time learning this theory because it is
crucial to subsequent discussion. A second set of articles, stemming from a paper by Spence 
and Owen, 55 uses modern monopolistic competition theory to analyze the problem. We will
spend less time on these models because, for our purposes, they add little to the insights from 
the Steiner models. 
1 .  Steiner Models 
a. Steiner's Original Article
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Steiner wrote his article in an effort to map the relationship between (monopolistic or
competitive) market structures in broadcasting and the "nature and quality of particular -
programs" produced by the industry.56 Steiner took as given the "three cornered" nature of 
the broadcasting industry: broadcasters lure audiences with programs and sell the audiences to 
advertisers, who in turn show advertisements to the audiences. Audiences do not pay directly 
for the broadcast programs. Within this framework, Steiner asked his readers to make the 
following assumptions. First, once a program has been broadcast, there is no additional cost 
of adding another viewer. (In this sense, broadcasting is a public good). There is one time 
period in which a broadcaster must decide what to program. He can select one from a series 
of program "types", and will make his choice so as to maximize the number of viewers (or lis­
teners) for his station. Each viewer wishes to watch one type of programming, and will watch 
if that type is shown. Otherwise, the viewer will not watch. 
Table I here 
The essence of Steiner's insight can be captured by looking at a numerical example in 
table 1. Assume that there are only four types of program -- Li, L2, L3, L4 -- and that 
there are 210 consumers who prefer Li, 75 who prefer L2, 50 who prefer L3, and 31 favor L« 
Within the model's assumptions, consider the program mix that will be produced by 1 ,  2, 3, or 
4 competitive broadcasters. 
Table 2 here 
As shown in table 2, if there is only one broadcaster, he will show L1 and garner all 210 
viewers of that type. A second, competitive broadcaster, will also show Li, because he can 
get 105 ( 1/2 of 210) viewers, which is better than the 75 viewers he could get from showing 
L2. A third competitor will show L2, because a third channel of Li would get only 70 
viewers, whereas L2 gets 75. But a fourth competitor would choose to show Li, because 70 
viewers is more than it could get with any other choice. 
Table 3 here 
In contrast, as shown in table 3, a monopolist that controlled all channels would never 
choose to duplicate any programs. As long as the advertising revenues from the least popular 
type of show (L4) were sufficient to cover costs of production and exhibition, the monopolist 
would utilize all available channels and show a diverse mix. The three types of minority­
interest programming, L2, L3, and L4, would gain much more exposure in a monopolistic,
rather than a competitive market. 
9 
Steiner's article is crucial for two reasons. First, his method of formalizing models of 
broadcasting markets changed the way subsequent scholars have looked at the industry. 
Second, his rather startling conclusion that a monopolist can be expected to cater to minority 
tastes more than competitors both explained many viewers' sense of the overwhelming 
"sameness" of offerings on the network triopoly, and challenged our traditional reverence for 
competition. 
b. Bebee's Article 
Steiner's insights were independently rediscovered and slightly extended by Rothenberg in 
1962,57 and then extended further by Wiles in 1963,58 but the biggest advance on these
models was produced by Bebee in 1977.59 
i. Assumptions
Although many of Be bee's basic assumptions mirror those of Steiner, the assumptions
about viewer preferences and behavior differ substantially. In particular, Bebee varied the 
degree to which the distribution of preferences is skewed across program types, and also 
varied the extent to which viewers are willing to watch mass appeal programming if their 
favorite types are not available. Bebee's model assumed that there are five program types and 
five groups of viewers. Bebee made nine alternative assumptions about market demand, 
derived by crossing three alternatives about the number of viewers in each of the groups with 
three alternatives about program preferences within the groups: 
Table 4 here
Table 4 fills in the details of Bebee's assumptions. His first set of assumptions about viewer 
preferences ("viewers watch only first choice") corresponds to Steiner's assumptions. His 
second assumption allows each viewer to have a second choice. For example, viewers in group 
number 5 prefer to view program type five, but if no type five program is on they will be 
willing to view type four. If neither program type five nor type four is available, viewers in 
group five will not watch. Viewers in group one are willing to watch only type one programs. 
With Bebee's third assumption -- that there is a common denominator -- all viewers will be 
willing to watch type one programs. For viewers in group one this is the only type of 
program they will be willing to watch. For members of all other groups, however, type one 
programming represents an acceptable second or third choice. 
Bebee's three alternative assumptions about the sizes of the viewer groups, also listed in 
tabie 4, complete his assumptions about viewer demand.
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Bebee provides eight alternative characterizations of program supply. First, he varies 
program costs, assuming that they are either high (requiring an audience of at least 1,200 
viewers to break even) or low (requiring an audience of only 800 viewers to cover costs). 
Second, Bebee allows channel capacity to be limited (three channels) or unlimited. Third, he 
allows the broadcasting channels to be controlled either by a monopolist or by a set of 
competitors. By crossing (l)  high and low costs with (2) limited and unlimited channel 
capacity and with (3) monopolistic and competitive control of broadcast channels, Bebee 
provides eight characterizations of program supply. 
With nine alternatives for market demand, and eight alternative characterizations of 
program supply, Bebee has 72 different economies to analyze. For each of these economies, 
Bebee calculates the equilibrium program output with a computer program.60 Then, by observ­
ing the changes in programming output as only one of the variables changes, Bebee observes 
the effect of that particular variable. 
In Bebee's model a monopolist provides whatever will maximize his own profits, given the 
other parameters of the economy, and does so by wooing the largest total audience for the 
broadcasting system. Whatever a monopolist provides is, by definition, the programming output 
of the industry. 
Calculating the programming output of a competitive industry is a bit more complex. A 
competitor, like a monopolist, wishes to maximize his own profits, but does so by maximizing 
the size of the audience on his own channels, given what other competitors offer. To predict 
the simultaneous output of several competitors, Bebee uses the following concept of equi­
librium. Competitive broadcasters are in equilibrium01 if no competitor has an incentive to 
alter his own program offering so long as no one else changes his programming, either. Bebee 
assumes that competitive broadcasters will reach an equilibrium, and once having done so will 
remain there. The programming output of the broadcasting industry can then be calculated. 
ii. Results
We will not go over all of Bebee's results, for they are not all of central importance to 
this article's purposes. We will discuss several of them, however, to understand how the 
broadcasting industry produces minority-interest programming in Bebee's model. 
* 
** 
Table 5 here 
here the solution is a cycle of program offerings (similar to the child's game of scissors, 
rock, and paper), rather than a stable, pure strategy equilibrium. 
this case was not included in Bebee's chart
Table 5 contains the results of five cases in Bebee's paper.6Z Case number I corresponds 
1 1  
to Steiner's original result. If viewers will watch nothing other than their first choices, and 
if viewer groups are highly skewed, a monopolist will produce some minority interest 
programming, while competitors will tend to duplicate whatever the largest group likes best. 
However, as we begin to diverge from the two assumptions about market demand inherent in 
the Steiner paper, Steiner's results begin to fail. Case three uses the same preference pattern 
as case one, but assumes that the viewer groups are almost equally sized. In this case the 
monopolist will program the maximally diverse offering, but so will competitors. (Note that as 
long as each of the three competitors believes that the others will continue to offer the 
equilibrium programming, none will change his own offering.) Case six shows that competition 
can be much more diverse than monopoly. If viewers are all willing to watch common 
denominator programming, and if viewer groups are of almost equal size, a monopolist will 
provide nothing but common denominator programming,63 while competitors will offer a 
completely diverse lineup. 
Together, these examples show that there is an interaction between the variable of 
monopolistic versus competitive control of broadcasting channels, and the distribution of 
viewer tastes. Monopolists produce more minority interest programming if viewers are 
unwilling to watch anything but their first choices, and if their first choices are highly 
skewed. But competitors produce much more minority interest programming if viewers are 
willing to watch common denominator programming, and their first choices are fairly evenly 
distributed. 
Bebee calculates the programming output for all of the 72 alternative economies and finds 
several tendencies. First, the interaction between the existence of competitive or monopolistic 
control of the broadcasting industry and the distribution of viewer tastes and preferences 
described in the paragraph above persists as long as the number of channels is quite limited. 
Monopolists will produce common denominator programming if viewers will watch it, and 
competitors will duplicate the first preferences of large groups (rather than produce minority 
interest programming) if the distribution of viewer preferences is skewed. However, if the 
number of channels is quite large, competitors will produce at least as much minority interest 
programming as will a monopolist. 
Second, consumers are never made worse off by the addition of additional channel 
capacity.64 In particular, the amount of minority interest programming never contracts in 
response to an expansion of channel capacity, and sometimes it increases. 
Third, Bebee notes than program costs, included in his model as a minimum audience size 
needed for a program to break even; can change the analysis drastically. If costs are high 
relative to the potential audience for a program, neither a monopolist nor competitors will 
12 
produce the program, leaving channels vacant rather than produce the minority interest pro­
gramming. In such cases, the observed duplication of the first choices of large groups (by 
competitors) or common denominator programming (by a monopolist) should not be taken as 
evidence that viable, but less profitable minority interest programming is being ignored. 
iii. Missing Links? 
Are any of Bebee's results dependent on crucial, unrealistic assumptions? The most 
important, which will be explored within the context of monopolistic competition models, is 
the assumption that viewers do not pay directly for programming. The arrival of pay-per view 
will make such an assumption faulty. In addition, different audiences have different 
demographic appeal, and this is not directly addressed in the Steiner model. However, nothing 
much turns on this, as one can just "count" a viewer with more demographic appeal (read 
disposable income) as more than one viewer. The model then works fine. Third, Bebee's 
results assumed that ad prices would be the same in a monopolistic and a competitive environ­
ment. However, a monopolist would likely restrict available ad minutes so as to raise their 
price and his profits.65 This might provide a direct benefit to some viewers. How would it
affect minority interest programming? Depending on the elasticities of demand for minority 
interest programming and common denominator programming, a monopolist might find minority 
interest programming more profitable, less profitable, or unchanged when compared to common 
denominator programming under a competitve pricing system. In general, nothing can be said 
about this effect. 
2. Monopolistic Competition
In 1977 Spence and Owen introduced a monopolistic competition model of broadcasting
competition so as to evaluate the welfare consequences of monopoly versus competition within 
a context of either advertiser support or direct viewer payments for programs.66 Spence and
Owen use a traditional economic measure of welfare -- the total of producer and consumer 
surplus67 -- to evaluate the output of the broadcasting market. Although a welfare analysis
of the broadcasting market can be quite interesting in its own right, for our purposes we are 
more interested in the positive description of the industry's output. For this reason we will 
first learn the basics of a monpolistic competition model, and then summarize its predictions, 
given alternative assumptions, about the final program mix in the industry. 
Spence and Owen's monopolistic competition model, in its most general form, posits that 
no firm's programming output can be duplicated exactly by a competitor. However,
competitors can broadcast programming that consumers regard as imperfect substitutes. This 
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shapes demand for each firm's output. The better are the substitutes for a station's 
programming, the less market power it has. Each firm must decide what programming to 
produce, given the decisions of the other stations.68 The decisions are shaped by whether or 
not viewers pay directly for programming, as well as whether the industry is controlled by a 
single monopolist, or has a place for many monopolistic competitors. 
After a great deal of mathematical grinding69, Spence and Owen discover some biases in 
the broadcasting system. First, they consider pay-TV with competition between channels. If 
minority taste programs have steep inverse demand functions -- that is they are very highly 
desired by a small number of people, and desired by a greater number only at very low prices 
(if at all) -- then there will be a "bias" against producing minority interest programming. 
However, we must be careful to note that Spence and Owen have a very special meaning for 
the word bias in this context. They mean that majority interest shows that produce little 
consumer surplus may be more profitable than minority interest shows that produce a great 
deal of consumer surplus. Thus, from the standpoint o f  welfare economics, a monopolistically 
competitive industry may produce too few minority interest programs. Spence and Owen only 
describe a tendency in the industry. They do not compute exact industry output, nor do they 
suggest that there will be no minority interest programming. Next, they ask if advertiser­
supported television would suffer from the same sort of bias, and conclude that the bias 
against minority interest programming would be even worse than it was under pay-TV. 
Second, Spence and Owen find that there will be a bias against costly programs, again 
measured by the consumer and producer surplus norm.70 And, last, they find that a
monopolist will, not surprisingly, restrict the number of shows so as to raise prices, and 
reduce overall welfare.71 
The Spence and Owen analysis has been extended and modified in a only a few papers, 
but most of the results are aimed at a welfare analysis of various market structures, rather 
than directed at the question of minority programming.72 To the extent that the newer 
literature does address questions of minority interest programming, it tends to reach the same 
conclusions that the Steiner and Spence-Owen models reached. [For example, Waterman 
analyzes the programming choices of a monopolist cable television operator who has control 
over production budgets, and who faces either advertiser or pay support, within a context of 
limited or unlimited channel capacity.73 Waterman finds that as the number of channels 
increases, the audience fragments and minority-interest programming finds its way onto the 
cable system.] Borenstein finds that a system with a limited number of broadcast licenses will 
have a bias against n1inorit<y�interest programming.74 
3. Public Choice Models 
1. Noam's Model
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Eli Noam has published a model that utilizes techniques first developed in the literature
on public choice, in particular voting behavior and candidate's platform choices.75 Noam
assumes that every program can be located on a one dimensional scale running from "low 
culture" to "high culture." (Although Noam does not says so, I would guess that public 
broadcasting's "Masterpiece Theater" is high culture, while the Disney Channel's "Mouseter­
piece Theater" is low culture.) A given type of programming has a "pitch" -- Noam's term for 
the program's point on the culture dimension. Each viewer has a most preferred pitch. If his 
favorite type of program is shown he will watch. If his most preferred type of program is 
not shown, the viewer might or might not watch. The further the distance from his most 
preferred pitch to the closest substitute shown, the less likely the viewer is to watch. 
Noam assumes that viewer tastes are distributed normally76 and then analyzes the
programming choices of broadcasters under conditions of monopoly or competition, single or 
numerous channels, and private or public control. 
Noam first shows that if there is only one broadcast channel, and a private, profit­
maximizing monopolist controls it, and if all portions of the audience are equally valued by 
the advertisers, the moriopolist will program so as to maximize audience -- achieved by
choosing the pitch equal to the midpoint of the normal distribution. If viewers who prefer 
high culture programs have more income, and are therefore more desired by advertisers, the 
monopolist will shade his program choice toward high culture. Noam then shows that if the 
government controls the broadcasting station, it will program so as to achieve its own goals. 
If the nature of programming were to be an issue in an election, rival parties would promise
programming so as to woo voters. Assuming that the distribution of voters and viewers is 
identical, a two-party system would converge upon centrist programming.77 Noam also inves­
tigates the use of a government broadcasting monopoly for spoils purposes, and for propagan­
da, but Noam's most important analysis for our purposes involves multichannel television. 
Noam's conclusions are generally consistent with those of Bebee and the Spence-Owen 
models. Most crucial is that numerous competitors will have an incentive to serve minority 
tastes. 
As the number of stations increases, their spread across the distribution widens, 
i.e., more "outlying" program tastes are reached. At the same time, the spacing
between the chosen program pitches decreases, and viewers find closer substitutes 
for their favored program pitches. 78 
However, Noam also concludes that a duopoly will not converge to common programming, but 
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rather differentiate their programs. This is a direct result of Noam's assumption about viewer 
preferences -- that as the distance from a favorite program pitch to the closest offered 
program grows, the probability of viewing declines -- and shape of the distribution of viewer 
tastes. This includes some of the same logic as Bebee's first preference pattern, where 
viewers are willing to watch only first choices, and a nearly rectangular distribution. With 
these preferences competitors also differentiated themselves. Noam also finds that it will take 
many competing stations before those whose tastes lie at the extremes will be served. (The 
success of the "Gong Show" may prove that those at the low culture end of the spectrum have 
a chance at being served by commercial broadcasters.) This provides, he says, a rationale for 
having a government-controlled channel produce some minority-interest programming. If the 
government does so, however, commercial broadcasters will have much Jess incentive to 
produce such minority-interest broadcasting material on their own. 79 
ii. Cox's Models of Candidate Platform Competition
Gary Cox has analyzed the strategies of politicians who are attempting to maximize their 
share of the vote by choosing positions on a one dimensional (liberal-conservative) 
dimension. 80 He has shown that if voters have ideal positions on the issue dimension, and
that they will vote for candidates who are closer, rather than those who are farther away, 
then as long as there are at least 3 candidates, not all candidates will take the same position
on the issues.81 In addition, if there are m candidates, at least one of the candidates will
choose a position such that at least (m-1/m) of the voters are to the left, and another will 
choose a position such that at least (m-1/m) of the voters are to the right.82 In other
words, not all candidates will be centrist, and the more candidates there are in the race, the 
more extreme some of them will be. 83
Cox's results also have meaning for the broadcasting market. If broadcast programming 
can be characterized as having a position on a one dimensional space (as in Noam's work), and 
if viewers will watch the programming closest to their ideal program, then audience­
maximizing broadcasters' behavior is described by Cox's model. As long as there are 3 
broadcasters in a market, not all will broadcast the same thing. And if there are m 
broadcasters, at least one of them will program such that at least (m-1 /m) of the viewers are 
to the left, and another will program such that at least (m-1/m) of the viewers are to the 
right. The more broadcasters there are, the more "extreme" some of the will be. Put 
differently, if adding more broadcasters into a market will increase service to the "minority" 
audiences out at the endpoints of the dimension. 
4. Pulling the Theories Together
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I n  general, these theoretical works agree o n  the circumstances under which profit­
maximizing broadcasters will provide minority-interest programming. If viewers are unwilling 
to watch anything but first choices, and if their first choices are highly skewed, and if the 
number of channels is quite limited, then a monopolist will produce more minority-interest 
programming than will competitors. On the other hand, if viewers are willing to watch mass­
appeal (a.k.a. common denominator) programming and if first choices are close to evenly 
distributed, competitors will provide much more minority-interest programming. This result 
holds regardless of whether the number of channels are limited or not. If the number of 
channels is extremely large, competitors will tend to provide at least as much minority­
interest programming as a monopolist. Intermediate cases produce intermediate results. 
Later in this paper I will ask how, if at all, including the race, ethnic origin or sex of a 
broadcast station owner might be expected to alter the basic theory of producing minority­
interest programming. But before I do that, I will stop to check some empirical work that 
seeks to test the basic theory of program selection. After all, if the basic theory were to 
fail to predict basic observations, I would have much less warrant for relying upon that 
theory, below. 
B. DATA TESTING THE BASIC THEORY 
In a very recent working paper Rogers and Woodbury84 provide a statistical test aimed 
at evaluating whether an increase in the number of radio stations in a market produced an 
increase in the number of formats. Rogers and Woodbury used the number of formats as the 
dependent variab!e85, and used market population, median household income, and a some 
demographic variables as the independent variables. To get some measure of the dispersion of 
tastes in the population -- a variable Bebee's analysis suggests is crucial -- Rogers and 
Woodbury use percentage of the market population over age 34, percentage that is Black, and
percentage that is Hispanic. The results tend to confirm the basic theory of programming 
choice. The coefficients of the number of stations in the market, and the coefficients of the 
measures of Black and Hispanic population are all positive and significant. Only percentage of 
the population over 34, which seems less connected to taste dispersion than the Black and
Hispanic variables, and the income measure, which is poorly tied into the basic theory in the 
first place, are insignificant. 
Waterman and Grant86 assembled a data base from a sample of 16  full days of
programming on 40 naiionally-distributed cable and broadcast networks between January 1 and 
June 30, 1986. Waterman and Grant included 26 basic cable networks87, 1 1  premium
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channels88, and three broadcast networks.89 They coded all programming by subject matter90,
by origin91, and by format92, and then obtained Neilsen ratings for 19 networks on which
ratings were available. Waterman and Grant found that cable networks offered a huge 
increase in number and diversity of offerings over that available on the three broadcast 
networks. The increase includes offerings in such categories as "Classical/Ethnic music or 
dance" and "Foreign Language" -- categories in which ABC, NBC, and CBS offer nothing.93
The authors conclude that the expansion of channel capacity in cable television has produced 
a substantial amount of new diversity in programming. This supports the basic model of 
minority-interest programming that we developed in section __ , above. 
D. PUTTING THE RACE AND SEX OF THE OWNER OF BRAODCAST ST A TIONS 
INTO THE MODEL OF MINORITY-INTEREST PROGRAMMING 
This section will ask how the race and sex of the owner of a broadcasting station might 
be included in the programming models discussed above. I will review the three most obvious 
possibilities. First, race and sex might be irrelevant. Second, minority or female owners of 
stations might engage in some consumption through choice of programming that does not 
maximize profits. Third, minority or female owners might have cost advantages (vis a vis 
white males) at broac!castiilg minority interest programming. 
I. Race and Sex Might Be Irrelevant to Programming Decisions of Owners 
It is possible that all owners, regardless of race or sex, are motivated by the desire for 
profit. Further, talent and cost-effectiveness at broadcasting different formats might be 
randomly distributed across races and sexes. If this is so, the models used above would not 
be altered at all, and any empirical investigation would find that, after controlling for all 
other factors (such as number of stations in a market), formats should be distributed randomly 
across races and sexes. 
In fact, it is even possible that the null hypothesis is correct but that we will find 
minority owners programming for minority audiences more frequently than do white males. 
The models of programming choice described in the sections xx, above, showed that as the . 
number of outlets increased, minority programming tended to become more and more profitable 
for broadcasters. We shall find in section yy,94 below, that the FCC's policies of increasing
the number of stations may have spurred more minority programming. The Commission, using 
its minority preferences in comparative hearings, may have given a large number of the new 
broadcasting stations to minorities.95 These nev; owners may have found that the most
profitable thing to program was minority programming. Hence, we might find new owners of 
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broadcasting, themselves racial or ethnic minorities, choosing to program for minority 
audiences, even though the new owners desire only profits and have no cost advantage in 
programming for minority groups. 
2. Race and Sex Might Be Important Because of Consumption Behavior
Female or minority station owners might be motivated consumption, as well as profit
maximization. This might be because of a desire to see programming that appeals to the 
owner get on the air, or it might be out of a feeling of "solidarity" with the owner's group. 
Women might feel that they owe it to their oppressed sisters to broadcast female-oriented 
material, regardless of whether or not some profits must be sacrificed. And Black, Hispanic, 
etc., owners might have similar feelings about broadcasting for other Blacks, Hispanics, and so 
forth. But whatever the source of these feelings, such owners might be willing to sacrafice 
profits to present minority-interest programming.96 
How would such an insight be worked into the models discussed above? We will work 
with a modification of Bebee's paper, mainly because it seems the easiest to adapt and 
demonstrate the probable changes. Within his model, we would designate a minority owner as 
"M", and assume that M will choose to program minority taste programming (that which is the 
first choice of the smallest group) as long as it garners an audience size that is at least 
within X viewers of M's next best alternative. To understand this approach, we will work 
through several examples that rely on table __ , below, which is a slight modification of the 
scheme in Bebee's article. 
Table 6 here
We will systematically work through several examples, each assuming that there are three 
competitive broadcasters. First we will compute the expected equilibrium, given assumptions 
about the size of viewer groups and the configuration of viewer preferences. Then we will 
ask how the analysis might change if one of the broadcasters were a minority group member. 
Example 1 A -- Viewers watch only first choice, and viewer groups are highly skewed.
If we have viewer preference pattern 1 ,  with group distribution A, and there are 3 chan­
nels, each run by a profit maximizing competitor, the competitors will produce program type 1 
on three different channels, and split 8,000 viewers three ways = 2,666 viewers, each. Now,
let us assume that one of the broadcasters is M, who by definition comes from the smallest 
group, 5. M has a desire to show programming for his group. If he does so, however, he will 
get only 1 2  viewers, a drop of 2,654. Only if tv1 has an extremely intense preference for this 
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sort of consumption will h e  show type 5 programming. If he does this, the remaining two 
broadcasters will get 4,000 viewers, each, by showing programming type I .  
Example l B  - - Viewers watch only first choice, and viewer groups are skewed. 
If we have viewer preference pattern l ,  with group distribution B, the three competitors 
will show two versions of programming type l ,  and one version of programming type 2 .  Each 
broadcaster will get 2,500 viewers. Now, if one of the broadcasters is M, he must be willing 
to get only 3 1 3  viewers instead of 2,500, a drop of 2, 1 87, to broadcast programming type 5. 
If M were to show type 5, the remaining two profit maximizing would either both show type 
l ,  producing 2,500 viewers each, or one broadcaster would show type 1 and the other would 
show type 2, producing 5,000 and 2,500 viewers, respectively. {The broadcaster who would 
show type 2 would be indifferent between doing so or showing type 1 ,  for both strategies 
produce 2,500 viewers. The broadcaster who shows type 1 can do no better than this, 
regardless of what the other broadcaster decides to do. The expected audience size would 
therefore be (5,000+2,500+2,500+2,5000)/4 = 3,167 for each, assuming that the two strategy sets 
were equally probably.) 
Example JC - - Viewers watch only first choice, and viewer groups are distributed nearly 
rectangularly 
If we have viewer preference pattern I ,  with group distribution C, the three competitors 
will show one version each of programming type l ,  2, and 3. The broadcasters will get 1 ,077, 
970, and 872 viewers. If one of the broadcasters is M, his decision to program type 5 will 
get only 707 viewers. The number he would have to give up depends, of course, on whether 
M would show type I ,  2, or 3 if he were to forgo showing type 5. If we assume that the 
three alternatives are equally probable, we can calculate M's expected audience from forgoing 
type 5 as { l ,077 + 970 + 872)/3 = 973. Hence, M would need to give up 973-707 = 266 to 
show type 5. If he were to show program type 5, the remaining two profit maximizers would 
show types I and 2, and would get 1,077 and 970 viewers. 
These three examples should, first, illustrate how we are including the minority status of 
owners within the model. Second, they produce an important insight: 
Insight 1 As the distribution of viewer tastes becomes more rectangular, minority owners 
need to sacrafice less to satisfy a taste for programming for minority listeners. 
In example IA, M had to sacrafice 2,654 viewers (=26.5% of total) to show type 5. In example 
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1 B  M had to give up 2, 1 87 (=22.6% of total) to show type 5. And in example I C, M had to 
give up 266 (=6.0% of total). Clearly, the "cost" of showing type 5 falls as the distribution 
becomes more rectangular. This means that, for example, it will be far less costly for a Black 
owner to broadcast Black oriented material in areas with substantial Black populations, such as 
Los Angeles or New York, than in areas with relatively fewer Blacks, such as Phoenix or Salt 
Lake City. 
Example 2A -- Viewers have unique second choices, and viewer groups are highly skewed. 
If we have viewer preference pattern 2, and group distribution A, three competitive 
programmers will show three versions of type I programming and get 3,200 viewers each. 
(Recall that viewers in group 2 will watch type 1 programming if no type 2 is available.) If 
one of the broadcasters is M, he will have to give up 3,188 viewers (= 3,200 - 12) to satisfy 
his preference for showing type 5. If he were to do so, the remaining two profit maximizing 
broadcasters would each show type I and get 4,800 viewers, each. 
Example 2B -- Viewers have unique second choices, and viewer groups are skewed. 
If we have viewer preference pattern 2, and group distribution B, three competitors will 
show two versions of type 1 ,  getting 2,500 viewers, each, and one version of type 2, getting 
3,750 viewers. The expected audience size is therefore (2,500+2,500+3,750)/3 = 2917 .  If one of 
the broadcasters is M, he must give up at least 2,91 7  - 3 1 3  = 2,604 viewers to show type 5. 
If he were to do so, the remaining two broadcasters would show one version of type I and 
one version of type 2, garnering 5,000 and 3,750 viewers, respectively. 
Example 2C -- Viewers have unique second choices, and viewer groups are distributed nearly 
rectangularly. 
If we have viewer preference pattern 2, and group distribution C, three competitors will 
engage in a cycle, showing types 1 ,  2, 3, and 4 each 75% of the time. The cycle will be 
( 1 ,2,3) -> (2,3,4) -> ( 1 ,3,4) -> ( 1 ,2,4) -> (1 ,2,3).97 This gives an average of 926 viewers per
broadcaster. If one of the broadcasters is M, he must give up 926-707 = 219  to show type 5. 
If he were to do so, the remaining cycle will be ( 1 ,2) -> (2,3) -> ( 1 ,3) -> ( 1 ,2), producing an 
average of 973 viewers for each of the two remaining broadcasters. 
Example 3A -- Viewers have a common denominator choice, and viewer groups are highly 
skewed. 
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If we have viewer preference pattern 3, and group distribution A, three competitors will 
show three versions of type I programming, attracting 3,332 viewers to each channel. If one 
of the broadcasters is M, he must give up 3,332- 12 = 3,320 viewers to show type 5. If he 
were to do so, the remaining two broadcasters would both show versions of type I ,  and get 
4, 992 viewers apiece. 
Example 3B -- Viewers have a common denominator choice, and viewer groups are skewed. 
If we have viewer preference pattern 3, and group distribution B, three competitors will 
show three versions of type I ,  getting 3,229 viewers, each. If one of the broadcasters is M, 
he must give up 3,229-313  = 2916 to show type 5. If he were to do so the remaining two 
broadcasters would each show type I and get 4,687 .5 viewers. 
Example 3C98 -- Viewers have a common denominator choice, and viewer groups are
distributed nearly rectangularly. 
If we have viewer preference pattern 3, and group distribution C, three competitors will 
show three versions of type 1 and get 1470.3 viewers each. If one of the broadcasters is M, 
he must give up 1 ,470.3 -707 = 763.3 viewers to show type 5. If he were to do so, the 
remaining two broadcasters will each show type I and get 1 ,852 viewers. 
Table 7 reveals the pattern that emerges. 
Table 7 here 
Table 7 clearly supports insight I; as viewers are distributed more nearly rectangularly, the 
cost of serving minorities falls. This remains true regardless of the viewer preference 
pattern. But Table 7 also provides some support for another insight. 
Insight 2: Serving minority groups becomes more costly if viewers are willing to watch 
common denominator programming. 
The figures in column 3 provide support for insight 2. The reason for this is quite 
intuitive. If viewers are all willing to watch common denominator programming, M is forced 
to forego viewers from all other groups when he chooses to show type 5. 
Now, consider what would happen if one of the two remaining broadcasting licenses in 
each market were to be given to a second minority group member, named M2. Table 8,  below, 
gives the percentage of the viewership market that M2 would have to give up to satisfy a 
taste forshowing type 5, on the assumptio11 that M has already decided to show type 5. 
Table 8 here 
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Note that M2 must give up more, and ususally much more, to provide a second source of 
type 5 to every type of market. This is due to two factors. First, M2 must forgo his share 
of the increased audiences that watch the remaining profit maximizing broadcasters. Second, 
he must share group 5 with M. 
Even if M2 were to decide to pay this cost, it is by no means clear that two versions of 
type 2 would be broadcast. Once M2 begins broadcasting type 5, M must also pay the "prices" 
that we listed for M2. M's share of group 5 has been cut in half by M2's actions, and if M 
were to choose the pure profit maximizing strategy he could get the big audiences that two 
profit-maximizers get to split. Hence, once M2 broadcasts type 5, M may choose to broadcast 
profit-maximizing material. In sum, we get 
Insight 3: Adding a second minority broadcaster into a market is less likely to produce a 
second source of minority programming than adding the first minority broadcaster was likely 
to produce a first source of minority programming. 
Other examples can provide another pair of important insights.99 
Example 4 -- Viewers will watch only their first choices, and viewers are distributed nearly 
rectangularly. 
If we have viewer preference pattern I ,  and group distribution C, but there are four 
channels run by four competitive broadcasters, the competitors will show types 1 ,  2, 3, and 4. 
If we then were to add a fifth channel and a fifth broadcaster, the fifth broadcaster would 
show type 5. If the fifth broadcaster happened to be M, we would observe M choosing to 
show type 5. 
In example 4, the expansion of channel capacity makes it profitable to show minority 
interest programming. M's decision to do so, however, reveals nothing about his motivation. 
M might be a profit maximizer, and his decision to show type 5 might be nothing more than 
good business judgment. This leads us to 
Insight 4: Observing that new channels in a market are allocated to minorities who choose to 
program for minority audiences does not necesarilly support the presumption that minority 
broadcasters have a taste for minority broadcasting. 
Example 5 -- Viewers will watch only their first choices, and viewers have a skewed distribu­
tion. 
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If we have viewer preference pattern 1 ,  and group distribution B, and there are 1 5  
channels run by competitors, and a broadcaster must get at least 600 viewers to break even, 
the broadcasters will show 8 versions of type 1 ,  4 versions of type 2, 2 versions of type 3,  
and 1 version of type 4. They will draw 625 viewers, each. If one of the broadcasters is M, 
he will have to sacrafice 625 - 3 1 3  = 312 viewers to show type 5. This amounts to half of 
his expected audience, but only 3.2% of the audience total. This is far less than the 22.6% of 
the market M would have to give up if there were only three broadcasters. 
Example 5 leads directly to 
Insight 5: Increasing the number of outlets reduces the cost to minority broadcasters of 
satisfying a taste for serving minority consumers. 
Putting together insights 1 through 5, we can see that a policy of awarding broadcasting 
licenses to minorities as a means of increasing minority broadcasting is most likely to work 
when the market has a substantial minority population that is currently unserved, despite the 
existence of many outlets in the community. However, if we simultaneously increase the 
number of outlets in a community and give one or more of the new outlets to minority 
owners, we cannot know, a priori, whether any new service to niit16tities is due to the 
increase in outlets, or is due to a taste for minority programming on the part of the new 
owners. 
3 .  Race and Sex Might be Important Because of Production Cost Advantages 
This explanation suggests that minority group members might tend to program for 
members of their own group because minority owners have lower costs of doing so than do 
white males. Because costs are less, break-even audience sizes will be smaller, and a minority 
format that looks like a money-loser to a white male will appear profitable to a minority 
owner. 
When and why would this explanation be right? After all, a skeptic might suggest, a 
white male owner can hire Black, latino, asian, or female program managers. These managers 
could program for minority audiences, utilizing whatever special virtues membership in the 
minority group bestows on the manager to raise the station's ratings to the highest possible 
level. Specially talented minority managers would be rewarded with special salaries by profit 
maximizing white male owners. In sum, being a minority owner will provide no advantage - ­
or, at best, an advantage equal to the cost of  hiring a manager (less the owner's best 
alternative wage). 
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The skeptic's account is incomplete. There is a substantial literature in economics and 
law about the difficulties of monitoring an agent's performance.100 Principles never know 
with certainty how well an agent is performing, and must make guesses about rewarding or 
punishing an agent based upon the performance of the enterprise. Because the performance of 
the enterprise depends upon many other factors, some of which are random, the principle has 
a difficult task. Anything that reduces the cost to the principle of evaluating the agent's 
performance will give the principle a cost advantage in production. 
I suggest that the production cost explanation is strongest when membership in a 
minority group gives a minority owner an advantage in monitoring the performance of a 
station manager. This explanation varies in liklihood and in strength for different minority 
groups.101 
a. Spanish Language (and Other Non English Language) Broadcasters
First, consider the case of non-English language stations, most of which are Spanish lan­
guage. These stations broadcast to particular minority communities that are isolated from 
mainstream, majority culture not only by customs and housing patterns, but also by language. 
A white (male) owner who (I presume) does not know the language, and who almost certainly 
does not live in the minority community and share in emerging social customs, trends, and 
fads, will be a great disadvantage in trying to judge the performance of a minority broadcast 
programmer. The owner will not even be able to understand the content of his own station. 
Even if he could, he will have no way of judging the quality of his programmer's strategy for 
attracting large numbers of minority listeners and viewers. After all, the programmer might 
be spending very little mental effort on his task, choosing to program safe, boring, middle of 
the road fare, despite changes in the community that would enable a different strategy to 
capture greater ratings. The white owner would have no way of knowing whether or not this 
were true. In contrast, a minority owner who (I presume) speaks the language and comes 
from the community, would suffer no such disadvantage.102
b. Black Community Broadcasting
Second, Black owners who broadcast for Black communities probably have similar, but
smaller, comparative advantages to those enjoyed by Hispanic owners who broadcast in 
Spanish. American Blacks tend to live in distinct areas and produce separate cultural 
trends.103 "Rap music" is probably the most obvious example to the white majority within the 
last few years, but the more general point is always true. Many American Blacks also speak a 
dialect of English that is significantly different from the English spoken by white 
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Americans.104 These factors will combine to give many American Blacks an advantage at
monitoring the performance of a manager who is programming for the Black community. 
However, these advantages will be smaller than those enjoyed by Hispanic owners because 
Black English is much closer to white English than is Spanish, and because many American 
Blacks who have enough money to purchase a broadcasting station will tend to come from 
middle and upper class communities that share much more with white America than does the 
lower-middle and lower class Black audiences that make up the target audience of Black 
programming.105 In addition, the tastes of Black audiences for radio programming has been 
moving a bit toward the white mainstream, to the extent that Black radio programmers have 
been forced to play songs by white artists to lure Black listeners.106 
c. Female Broadcasters 
Women broadcasters who program special material for other women comprise one of the 
most difficult cases. Women, as a group, are much more diverse, numerous, and dispersed 
than are the other groups I have discussed. For these reasons it is much less clear (to this 
author) exactly what women's programming includes. I suppose programs geared to the special 
biological concerns of women -- menstruation, childbearing, breastfeeding, menopause, diseases 
of female organs, etc. -- would be included. Perhaps programs aimed at special social and 
economic concerns of women would be included. But these programs, alone, can not fill in 
even a substantial portion of a radio or TV format. Some entertainment programming would 
also need to be included, but there is very little that would seem to appeal only to women. 
The most likely examples of network shows with strongly female audiences are "Cagney & 
Lacey" and "Kate and Allie",107 but these shows also drew very large numbers of men.
I suppose that the social and economic discrimination suffered by many women might give 
a femal owner some advantage in monitoring the performance of a manager who is 
programming for the female audience. But because women, as a group, speak essentially the 
same language that men do, and live in the same places, it is unclear why any such 
monitoring advantage should be large.108
d. Modelling the Cost Advantage 
How should we incorporate a cost advantage in monitoring managers into the models of 
broadcast competition? A cost advantage plays exactly the same role as a taste for broad­
casting minority programming. In part __ , above, I modelled a taste for minority programm­
ing as the willingness to give up a number of viewers by doing so. A profit-maximizing 
broadcaster who has a cost advantage at broadcasting to minority audiences will be willing to 
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give up viewers to do so, other things being equal, if the lost advertising revenues are less 
than his cost advantage. A large cost advantage translates into a willingness to give up many 
viewers, just as does a strong taste for minority programming. Thus the general lessons from 
the models in part should be applicable here. 
A policy of awarding broadcast licenses to minorities and women so as to increase 
programming targeted at these groups will be most effective in a market with substantial 
minority populations that are currently unserved by any of the large number of outlets in that 
market. In addition, to the extent that the policy depends upon cost advantages, it will be 
most effective for owners from non-English language minorities, slightly less effective for 
Black owners, and least effective for women owners. 
4. Potential Problems with the Models
Are these theoretical results of interest to a court that is testing the minority
preference policies, or are there serious problems that prevent using the theories to analyze 
the policies? Several potential problems suggest themselves: 
a. Federal Communication Commission policies may affect the choice of programming by
profit maximizing broadcasters. First, appliCants tor broadcasting stations nfay believe that 
proposing to present minority programming increases the chance of gaining the license. 
Similarly, incumbent broadcasters may well believe that presenting some minority programming 
increases the chance of a smooth, low-cost renewal. In fact, the FCC has gone so far as to 
suggest that every broadcasting station must program some minority materia!.109 Second, 
some other FCC policies may have increased the cost of presenting minority programming. 
For example, the FCC now claims that its administration of the fairness doctrine raised the 
cost of presenting nonmainstream political views to the public.110 
b. The models are all aimed at predicting service to groups with minority tastes for
broadcast programming. But the minority preference policies aim at racial and ethnic 
minorities and at women. The correspondence between these two sets of groups may vary 
greatly, depending upon the groups involved. As I suggested in section xx, above, in the 
Spanish-speaking population, demand for Spanish programming may be quite high and quite 
distinctive. But among women, there may be very few programs that are commonly desired. 
A second, and related difficulty with these models is that their definition of "minority" 
programming as that desired by a minority may fail to capture the subtle differences that 
might support the minority preference policies. It may be that minority and female owners 
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would program the same types of material as white males, but would do so in slightly 
different ways. For example, in presentation of the news, there might be a subtle difference 
of slant, so that interpretations of events more congenial to minority or female interests were 
presented. Viewers and listeners might be indifferent to the difference (in terms of the 
decision about whether or not to view or listen), but still might garner a somewhat different 
set of views about the world from watching or listening.111 
c. The models neglect the influence of cable television and other methods of delivering
minority programming. After all, one can purchase Spanish language records and tapes. To 
understand how cable, records and tapes would affect the analysis, hold the number of viewers 
or listeners of type I through type 4 constant. Now, presume that all listeners or viewers of 
type 5 material do not regard commercial announcements as a cost, but are highly sensitive to 
the out-of-pocket costs of puchasing cable, records or tapes. In this case, if no one in a 
market is showing type 5 material, and a broadcaster is considering doing so, the broadcaster 
could pick up all of the minority viewers or listeners by showing type 5. On the other hand, 
if the listeners or viewers of type 5 are sensitive to the implicit costs of commercial 
announcements, some will choose to purchase commercial-free material, and remove themselves 
from the pool of viewers or listeners to type 5 over-the-air. Type 5 will then appear less 
attractive to broadcasters. 
Now, if we introduce cable, tape, and record alternatives to type I through type 4 into 
the analysis, we would need to determine how many potential listeners or viewers were 
removed for these types, as compared to type 5, before we could determine whether or not 
type 5 programming became more or less likely. The analysis will likely become quite 
complex.112 
I suspect that the problems with these models are enough to cause many social scientists 
to blanche at the idea of using them. However, in this article I am not trying to figure out 
whether the state of the art would satisfy a social scientist, but rather whether a court might 
be willing to use the theories and data to uphold a law under attack. And for such a 
purpose, these models of the effect of race and sex on an owner's programming decisions may 
provide enough of a basis for a court to proceed to examine the data. 
E. DATA ON OWNERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS AND BROADCASTING CONTENT 
I.  Early Data 
The few sources of data on the relationship between ownership characteristics and 
broadcast content suggest nothing inconsistent with the model I have presented above. In an 
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article published in 1978 Lawrence Soley and George Hough III113 ascertained that the number 
of Black-owned radio stations114 had grown from 1 2  in 1970 to 56 to 1977. They produced 







TABLE 9 115 
Method of Acquisition by Black Broadcasters 
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1 7  
"Includes new frequency assignments, bankruptcy acquisitions, and transfers without 
compensation. 
Soley and Hough report that "[a]ll but two of the stations acquired between 1972 and 
1977 have had Black-oriented formats, programming primarily rhythm and blues, soul, jazz or 
gospel music."116 Thus, there was a significant connection between Black ownership, and this 
connection couid be consistent with either a "taste" for broadcasting to one's own group, or 
with a cost advantage at broadcasting to one's own group. Soley and Hough also suggest that 
a disproportionate number of Black-owned stations were in the top 50 markets. These markets 
tend to include large cites that have substantial Black populations. Recall that satisfying a 
taste for minority broadcasting or exploiting a cost advantage at minority broadcasting is 
easier in a market with a substantial minority population. Thus, the location of the Black­
owned stations is also consistent with the model. 
A 1981 article by Loy Singleton directly measured public service programming on Black­
oriented radio stations, as contrasted with other radio stations, and found no difference.117
Singleton concluded that granting more broadcasting stations to minority group members would 
not increase the amount of public service programming to minorities. His research, however, 
is so seriously flawed that no such conclusion can be drawn. The best that can be said for it 
is that it is consistent with any hypothesis about the connection between ownership 
characteristics and programming.118 
Another 1981 article, by Schement and Singleton119, measured public service programming
by white and Latino owners of Spanish language radio stations, and found no difference 
between the two. These results are also consistent with any hypothesis about the connection 
between ownership characteristics and programming.120
2. Congressional Research Service Study121
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Recall from the discussion in part that when the DC Circuit remanded the Steele 
case to the FCC, one of the central purposes of the remand was to allow the FCC to develop 
data on the relationship between ownership characteristics and programming content. To do 
that, the FCC sent questionaires to all radio and television licensees, requesting data about 
the percentage of ownership interest in the license by minority groups and women; about 
whether the distress sale, comparative hearing preference for women and minorities, or tax 
certificate policies were "involved" when the station was acquired; (for radio) about the 
format; and (for all stations) about any programming specially targeted at minorities, women, 
children, or senior citizens.122 Seventy nine percent of all stations responded, but when 
Congress passed Joint Resolution 395 at the end of 1987, the FCC had to terminate its 
inquiry.123 The Subcommittee on Telecommunications of the House Committee on Commerce 
and Energy then directed the Congressional Research Service ("CRS") to analyze the responses, 
and June 29, 1 988 the CRS released the results. 
The CRS report first compares the rates at which white male, minority, and female 
broadcast station owners choose to program for minorities, women, children, and senior 
citizens. The CRS lumped together aii broadcaster responses into one big pooi, rather than 
segregate them by market. The CRS claims that it was forced to do so because the FCC 
study elicited insufficient market identification and demographic data to make segregation by 
market feasible, and no alternative source of such information was available at low cost.124
To partially make up for this deficiency, the CRS chose five large markets126 and five small
ones,126 ran the same comparisons of programming choices of white male and other station 
owners within each market, and then compared the level of minority programming to the 
percentage minority population in each market. This last comparison was ostensibly an 
attempt to ascertain to what extent minority programming was "market driven'', rather than by 
ownership characteristics.127
To make this paper manageable, I will try to summarize the masses of data presented in 
the CRS report. However, for some of the general statements I will make, there will be one 
or more specific counterexamples. 
a. Aggregated Data For All Stations
The following chart summarizes the CRS findings on the number of broadcasting stations




Table 1 0  128
Number (percent) of total stations reporting 
minority ownership 
less than 51  % ownership 51 % or more ownership 
496 (5.7%) 166 (1 .9%) 
209 (2.4%) 87 (1 .0%) 
Asian/Pa- 87 (1 .0%) 16  (0.2%) 
cific 
Indian/ 
Alaskan 62 (0.7%) 39 (0.4%) 
Number (percent) of total stations reporting 
female ownership 
less than 5 1  % ownership 5 1  % or more ownership 
3,091 (35.4%) 619  (7. 1%) 
Total = 8, 720 stations reporting. 7 ,558 reported no minority owners. Female ownership was 
not broken down by race. 
Most of these figures for 5 1% or more ownership are consistent with recieved wisdom, 
but the numbers for minority, and especially female ownership interest at 50% or less seems 
higher than most people in the industry believe. 
The aggregated comparisons for ownership characteristics and programming choices show 
several general trends. First, minority owners are more likely to program for their own 
minority groups than other owners are. For example, 79% of all stations owned (51% or more) 
by Black owners target Black audiences. Only 20% of non-Black owned stations target Black 
audiences. Second, minority owners (51% or more) are no more likely to program for other 
ethnic groups than are nonethnic owners. For example, consider the following table. 
non-Black 
20 
Table 1 1 129 
Percent of Station In (>50%) Ownership Groups 
Broadcasting Black Programming 
Black 
79 
Hispanic Asian/Paclnd/ Alask 
8 1 3  1 3  
The resuits for aii ethnic groups are listed in table 1 2, belo'.v. 
Women 
25 
3 1  
The results also suggest that wome.n are somewhat more likely to program for other 
women than are men, but that women are not, in general, much more likely to program for 
minorities. 
Table 12  here 
Which of the three hypotheses about minority and female broadcast station owners -- no 
difference, taste, and cost advantage -- are consistent with these results? 
i. No Difference Hypothesis
It is possible, but not very likely, that the no difference hypothesis can be consistent
with these results. First, some third explanatory variables that have been left out of the 
model might produce these statistical patterns. For example, it is possible that minority and 
(to a lesser extent) female licensees have smaller, lower power stations than white males. 
Small stations might be much better suited to targeting minority and female audiences than 
large stations, so the tendency for minority owners to program much more for minorities 
might be explained, in part, by the size of the stations. Such an explanation fails, however, 
to explain why minority owners should program so much more for their own groups, and less 
for others. 
Example 4 from part __ , above, provides a second possible way of reconciling this data 
and the no difference hypothesis. That example showed that if we increase the number of 
channels in a market, minority broadcasting may become profitable for the first time. If the 
new channel is allocated to a minority broadcaster, that broadcaster will choose to broadcast 
minority interest programming even though he is a pure profit maximizer who has no 
particular cost advantage. Could such a scenario have been played out in American 
broadcasting over the past 1 0  to 20 years? That period of time covers the years when the 
minority preferences were in effect. Over the past 1 0  years the number of commercial 
television stations has grown from 7 1 1  in 1977 to 986 in 1987, AM radio stations have 
increased from 4,559 in 1977 to 4,866, and FM stations have climbed from 4,1 1 7  in 1977 to 
5,208 in 1987.130 Perhaps many of the new stations were given to minorities, who just 
happened to be in markets where minority broadcasting was rendered the most profitable 
alternative by the grant. 
Although such an explanation is possible, there are several good reasons to be skeptical. 
First, it relies on a coincidence of the same scenario being played out in market after market. 
Second, it does little to explain why minorities are broadcasting to their own groups so much 
more than other minority groups. This explanation should suggest that Black broadcasters 
would program for Hispanics and other minorities quite frequently, but the data does not bear 
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this out. Last, the early article by Soley and Hough 131 found that the vast majority of Black 
broadcasters bought their stations. If this trend continued it would be inconsitent with the 
no difference hypothesis. However, to truly rule out the no difference hypothesis, some 
market-by-market empirical work would need to be done. But until that work is done, I will 
regard the no difference hypothesis as unlikely. 
ii. Taste
Much of this data is consistent with the taste hypothesis we developed in part __ ,
above. Minority broadcasters target their own groups far more frequently than others do. A 
sense of group identification, a psychological need to communicate with one's own community, 
a desire to teach one's own group, a sense of pride in the ethnic group's music and culture, 
etc., could all explain why minority owners prefer to target their own groups. I have no a 
priori expectation of why female owners' taste for targeting women should be weaker (or 
stronger, for that matter) than minority owners' taste for targeting their own communities.132 
iii. Monitoring Cost Advantage
The CRS data tracks closely the predictions of the monitoring cost advantage
explanation. Hispanic owners, who were predicted to have the largest cost advantages, are� 7.4 
more likely to target Hispanic audiences than are non-Hispanic owners. Black owners, also 
predicted to have significant but slightly smaller cost advantages, are almost four times as 
likely to target Black audiences as are non-Blacks. And women, who were predicted to have 
only slight cost advantages, are only 1 .2 times as likely to broadcast to women as are men. 
This theory did not predict that minority or female owners would be more likely to target 
other groups, and the data does not show that they are, in general. In sum, the monitoring 
cost advantage hyppothesis does a pretty good job at explaining the data.133 
b. Data From Five Large and Five Small Markets
The CRS ran comparisons similar to those just described for all broadcasting stations in
five large and five small markets. The results for the large markets were quite similar to the 
results for the entire nation, but in the small markets there were so few stations with 
minority owners that the comparisons are rendered meaningless.134 When the CRS compared
the rate of broadcasting to minorities in the large markets with the percentage population in 
the market, it found that nonethnic owners tended to broadcast to minorities at a rate 
equalling the minorities' percentage in the population. Ethnic owners tended to target 
minority audiences at a higher rate.135 
c. The Data Might be Worthless
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One possibility is that these results are consistent with everything because they are
inherently unreliable. There is no definition of minority programming in the study, and all 
data is self-reported by licensees. No attempt was made to cross check the reliability of the 
reported data. Indeed, an such cross check would have required a working definition of 
minority programming. Hence, it is possible that the CRS study is picking up nothing more 
than different perceptions of minority owners, or different self-reporting rates of minority 
owners. 
The CRS study data on the most commonly used format by Black owners -- jazz - ­
partially reinforces these concerns. Jazz is  definitely a crossover format, like urban 
contemporary, utilized by large number of Black and white listeners.136 Black owners who 
program jazz may regard themselves as targeting a Black audience, while white owners who 
program identical matter may have no such self-perception. And Hispanic owners who program 
jazz may have something else in mind. 
In addition, there is the possibility that owners gave strategic responses. This 
questionnaire may have been percieved as a policy-making tool by the owners, who may have 
dissembled in an effort to shift federal policy toward minority preferences in broadcasting.137
3. Summary and Conclusions
The problems with the extant data would prevent any reputable social scientist from
placing much weight upon them. But a court, faced with the need to come to a decision 
about the legality of the minority preference policies, would have to go ahead and take 
another look at them. Even so, the early data do virtually nothing to shed light on which of 
our three theoretical positions -- no difference, taste, or monitoring cost advantage -- is most 
likely. The CRS study is a small advance, and suggests that either the taste hypothesis or 
the monitoring cost advantage, is most likely (although the no difference position cannot be 
ruled out completely). In particular, the monitoring cost explanation does the best job of 
predicting the general pattern of CRS results. However, because the CRS failed to evaluate 
its data against the background of a microeconomic model such as the one presented in this 
article, we have no way of knowing how large such a monitoring cost advantage is likely to 
be for each of the groups, or, similarly, how strong is the taste for broadcasting to one's own 
group. 
The next section will explore how a theoretical and evidentiary record such as this will 
work into a constitutional test of the minority preference policies. 
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE ROLE OF
EVIDENCE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNERS' CHARACTERISTICS AND 
PROGRAMMING CHOICES 
This section will provide a synopsis of the Constitutional law of affirmative action 
programs, and then apply that learning to the question of the constitutionality of minority 
preferences in broadcasting.138 We will see that under some value choices, the nexus between
minority ownership and programming choices is irrelevant, while under other value choices the 
evidence about the nexus crucial.139 
A. FROM BAKKE TO CROSON 
There are only four supreme court cases evaluating the constitutionality of programs that 
use explicit racial classifications so as to help minority groups and disadvantage whites.140
To provide readers who are inexpert in this corner of constitutional law a feeling for the 
discussion that follows, I must first sketch the facts and holdings in these four cases. To 
those who are experts, I must apologize in advance for what may appear at times an over­
simplification, but the collected opinions in these four cases total close to 400 pages in the 
official reports, and boiling them down to something useful leaves out a lot. 
I .  Regents of University of California v. Bakke141
The Bakke case tested the legality of a medical school affirmative action program. The 
UC Davis medical school set aside 1 6  places in its class for minorities, only. Whites could 
compete for the other 84 places. Bakke, a white man, was denied admission despite having 
test scores and grades far above those of the minority students accepted into the 16  reserved 
places. Bakke sued, claiming his rejection was a violation of the 14th Amendment. 
Justice Powell found that strict scrutiny was appropriate when testing an explicit racial 
classification, regardless of who was helped or burdened. Powell distinguished cases remedying 
specific, documented prior discrimination in schools or employment, 142 and listed the proffered
compelling state interests for the UC Davis program:143
(i)"reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical 
schools and in the medical profession," . . .  (ii) countering the effects of 
societal discrimination; (iii) increasing the number of physicians who will 
practice in communities currently underserved; and (iv) obtaining the 
educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body. 
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Powell rejected the first as forbidden discrimination "for its own sake." Powell rejected the 
second, as unbounded. The third was rejected because there was no evidence in the record to 
suggest that the minority physicians would be more likely to practice in minority communities 
than would whites (although it might be true) and because there may be ways to find 
applicants who have a desire to work in minority communties without using explicit racial 
classifications.144 
Justice Powell accepted the fourth goal -- attainment of a diverse student body -- as a 
"compelling interest" for a state school. Much informal learning takes place through casual 
interaction, and a diversity of backgrounds in student bodies produces more learning. But, 
Justice Powell cautioned, race must not be the only factor, for other elements aid learning, 
also. Therefore, race must be balanced and weighed against other elements, such as "personal 
talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated 
compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor,"145 
and cannot insulate some candidates from comparisons with other candidates. The Harvard 
admissions procedure, said Powell, provides a good modet.146 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun found that the U.C. 
Davis plan was constitutional by applying a form of intermediate scrutiny: "racial 
classifications designed to further remedial purposes "'must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.""'147
Remedying the effects of society-wide discrimination provided an important governmental 
interest if the discrimination produces a disparate impact upon the races in the government's 
programs. Here, said Brennan, U.C. Davis could conclude that the low rate of admissions of 
minorities was due to the effects of past discrimination.148 Under these circumstances, U.C.
Davis could explicitly take race into account in admissions decisions, even though some white 
applicants might be excluded. This is because white people's expectations of admission are 
based upon the lingering effects of past discrimination -- effects that the government is 
trying to eradicate.149
Brennan held that U.C. Davis had a sufficient factual predicate for concluding that the 
low rate of minority student admissions in medical schools stemmed from discrimination. First, 
there were statistics comparing the rates of Blacks and other minorities in medical schools and 
in medicine in the United States with the size of the Black population.150 Second, there was 
the history of discrimination against Blacks and other "minorities in education and in society 
generally, as well as in the medical profession."151 Nothing else was needed to show a 
connection between these two sets of facts. 
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Next, Brennan found that the U.C. Davis' program's use of race placed no unfair burdens 
on anyone involved. The program stigmatized neither minority applicants nor whites.152 And
Bakke's life was unlikely to be seriously affected, so there was no great fairness concern for 
him. 
Last, Brennan concluded that the U.C Davis program was reasonably related to its goals, 
in part because there was no way of satisfying the goal of integration without taking race 
into account, and in part because the U.C. Davis admissions program considered "on an 
individual basis each applicant's personal history to determine whether he or she has likely 
been disadvantaged by racial discrimination."153 
2. Fullilove v. Klutznick154
In May of 1977 Congress enacted Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 155 which
authorized spending $4,000,000,000 for federal grants to state and local governments for public 
works projects. In other words, this was delegated pork barrel!. Section 103(f)(2) of the Act, 
termed the "minority business enterprise" (MBE) provision, required that 10% of all expended 
funds be spent on minority owned businesses, unless that turned out to be infeasible.156 
Some associations of construction contractors filed suit, claiming that the MBE violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the equal protection "component of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."157
Chief Justice Burger's opinion, joined by Justices White and Powell, first reviewed at 
length the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the MBE provision. Congress had 
intensely scrutinized the fairness of allocations, primarily between geographic regions, 158 but
also between ethnic groups. The MBE provision's sponsor had pointed to the general disparity 
between the size of the United States' minority population ( 1 5%- 1 8%) and the percentage of 
federal procurement going to minority business enterprises (under I%), and had argued that a 
I 0% set aside was in keeping with established practice under the SBA.159 Burger spent five 
pages showing that Congress intended to remedy lingering effects of racial discrimination on 
today's economy, 160 and then a few more reviewing the Secretary's regulations -- particularly 
the waiver provisions allowing contractors relief from the MBE provision. 
Burger pointed out that this program originated under the Spending Power of the U.S. 
Constitution, 161 an independent grant of power to Congress which reaches as far as any of 
the regulatory powers of Congress, such as the Commerce Power.162 The Commerce Power,
said Burger, clearly gives Congress the power to regulate prime contractors on federally 
funded projects. As to state and local governments, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides power. When legislating to remedy lingering effects of discrimination, "Congress, of 
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course, may legislate without compiling the kind of 'record' appropriate with respect to 
judicial or administrative proceedings."163 But Burger did point out that Congress had data on 
disparity of contract procurment at federal, and also at state and local levels, from which it 
could conclude that this regulation was needed. Burger was clearly worried about the thinness 
of the factual record, but pushed the worries aside with references to the power of Congress 
in this area. He then pointed out that there was precedent implying that even though the 
prior discrimination may not have been unlawful at the time, Congress may act to remedy the 
effects.164 
Burger upheld the the MBE provision's means of using explicit racial classifications, but 
in doing so he refused to rely on any of the legal formulas from Bakke.165 Instead, he
stressed the role of administrative process. Burger argued that the administrative flexibility 
included within the system helped ensure the MBE provision's constitutionality.166 In 
particular, the MBE provision's overinclusiveness -- its tendency to give advantages in 
circumstances where they are not warranted -- was all right because the two fundamental 
congressional assumptions ( I )  that "the present effects of past discrimination have impaired 
the competitive position of"167 minority-owned businesses, and (2) that "affirmative efforts to
eliminate barriers to minority-firm access, and to evaluate bids with adjustment for the 
present effects of past discrimination, would assure that at least 10% of the federal funds . 
. would be"168 awarded to bona fide MBEs -- could be rebutted in the administrative process.
The administrative flexibility helped assure that fairness, justice, and the laudable purposes of 
the MBE provision would be protected in individual cases. 
Justice Powell, concurring, emphasized that racial classifications are prohibited unless 
justified by compelling governmental interest. A naked desire to prefer one group over 
another will not do, 169 but remedying effect of past discrimination will if there is finding of
legislative or constitutional violation, and a narrowly tailored means is chosen. Congress had 
power to find, and did find, much evidence of illegal discrimination. These findings need not 
appear in the legislative history of this statute; earlier legislative histories count, as well.170
Powell admitted that "fallthough the fillegall discriminatory activities were not identified with 
the exactitiide expected in judicial or administrative adjudication."171 the discrimination was
found with enough certainty to support a Congressional statute.172
Justice Marshall, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, concurred in the judgment. Marshall 
argued, on the basis of his Bakke opinion, for middle tier scrutiny of explicit racial classifica­
tions that disadvantage whites; the classification "for remedial purposes [must] serve important 
governmental objectives" and must be "substantially related to achievement of those objec­
tives."173 Congress had more than enough data from which to conclude that the small per-
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centage of federal construction dollars was the product of prior discrimination, and the 10% 
set aside was closely related to eradicating the effects of discrimination, said Marshall. 
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing first that racial 
classifications are per se void. But even if not, Congress had no evidence of prior 
discrimination by Congress in disbursing federal contracting funds, a necessary element of a 
remedial justification.174 General, societal discrimination will not do as a constitutional
substitute for Congressional discrimination.175
3. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education176
The Wygant case suggests a substantial change of attitude toward affirmative action
within the Supreme Court. 
In 1972 the Jackson Board of Education struck a deal governing layoffs -- termed Article 
XII -- with the teachers' union. That deal called for the layoff of white teachers with 
seniority to protect the jobs of Black teachers without seniority in order to maintain the 
Black/white balance among schoolteachers employed by the Board.177 But, in 1974, when
layoffs were needed, the Board refused to comply with Article XII, and instead laid off 
minority teachers who iacked seniority. When the union sued the Board in Federal Court, the 
court refused jurisdiction, partially on the ground that the union had presented insufficient 
evidence that the Board had ever discriminated in hiring. The union then brought suit in 
state court. The state court found that although the Board had not discriminated in hiring, 
and although the low percentage of minorities on the teaching force was due to societal 
discrimination, remedying societal discrimination was a sufficiently good reason for upholding 
Article XII's explicit racial classification.178
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the central issue was whether Article XII violated the 
equal protection clause of the 1 4th Amendment. Justice Powell, joined by Burger, Rehnquist 
(who had dissented in Fullilove), and O'Connor, enunciated a "compelling state interest" test, 
and required that any such interest be accomplished by "narrowly tailored" means. First, 
Powell rejected any question that "societal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial 
classification."179 Instead, the focus should be on the relation between the racial composition
of the teaching staff and the composition of the pool of qualified applicants. Second, Powell 
repudiated the "role model" theory, adopted by the District Court, that the need to provide 
Black students with good Black role models required the retention of Black teachers without 
seniority. In part, said Powell, the problem with this theory was that it was not remedial. 
[Question: Is this a non sequitur?] Justice Powell also claimed that the "role model" theory 
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might justify hiring only a small number of Black teachers whenever a school district has only 
a small number of Black students.180
When the union claimed that Article XII remedied past discrimination in employment by 
the Board, a valid purpose, Powell required that in "such a case, the trial court must make a 
factual determination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that 
remedial action was necessary."181 But in this case, no such determination had been made.
And even if it had been, the means chosen to remedy the discrimination were insufficiently 
tailored, said Powell.182 Whereas the 10% set aside in Fullilove spread burdens widely, Article
XII dumps huge burden on a few innocent third parties.183 
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, also disapproved of justifying explicit 
racial classifications by either remedying societal discrimination or by providing role models 
for Black students. But she cautioned the reader not to confuse the role model theory "with 
the very different goal of promoting racial diversity among the faculty."184
Justice Marshall, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, dissented, and reaffirmed his Bakke 
position that explicit racial classifications disadvantaging whites should be permitted as long as 
they serve important governmental purposes, and use means "substantially related" to achieving 
those purposes.185 Marshall painted a picture of a formerly racist Board, grudgingly agreeing
to Article XII under the gun of a threatened lawsuit. In addition, Marshall argued, quite 
forcefully, that Article XII was the least intrusive method of safeguarding the gains in hiring 
young minority teachers.186 
Justice Stevens, dissenting by himself, accepted the justification that an integrated 
faculty would better serve an integrated student body. Stevens (correctly) rejected the notion 
that this argument could justify resegregation, 187 drawing on the core values of the
Fourteenth Amendment to rule out acceptance of any racist arguments. 
In my opinion, the refusal of the majority to confront directly and honestly the powerful 
arguments in the dissenting opinions signals an important change of attitude toward affirma­
tive action. Although the verbal formulation of strict scrutiny was left unchanged, it was 
applied in such an unfriendly manner that Wygant signals a change in the law.188 Affirmative
action programs, at least at the state and local level, will almost always be invalidated. The 
Croson case, detailed below, partially confirms this prediction. 
4. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.189
Richmond, Virginia, adopted a five year plan requiring all prime contractors, other than 
those owned by minorities, to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of any contracts 
with Richmond to minority business enterprises (MBEs). 190 Witnesses at the public hearings 
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preceeding adoption of the plan introduced a lot of evidence of societal discrimination in 
construction contracting, but introduced "no direct evidence of race discrimination on the part 
of the city . . . .  "191 The Richmond Director of the Department of General Services 
promulgated a regulation allowing relief from the 30% rule if the general contractor had made 
every "feasible" attempt to comply, but there were not enough qualified MBEs in the area to 
enable the general contractor to comply.192 A plumbing contractor (J. A. Croson Co.) that
was neither allowed a waiver from the 30% rule, nor allowed to raise its bid by the $7,663.16 
in extra costs occasioned by the higher prices quoted by the only MBE subcontractor who was 
willing to bid on the project, sued Richmond, claiming that the 30% plan violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution. 
Justice O'Connor, joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, first criti­
qued193 Burger's opinion in Fullilove, by pointing out that its validation of explicit racial 
classifications rested on both the "unique" remedial powers of Congress under section 5 of the 
1 4th Amendment194 and the flexibility built in to the 10% set aside by the administrative
procedures for waiver. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress broad authority "to 
identify and redress society-wide discrimination", but gives no such authority to state and 
local governments, who are bound by section l of the 14th Amendment. In effect, argued 
O'Connor, power was reallocated from the states to Congress by section 5. Hence, Fullilove 
can be distinguished, for Congress has much greater power than a city. For Richmond to 
prevail, it would at least have to show that it had become a "passive participant" in race 
discrimination by the local construction industry, and was now attempting to remedy its 
involvement in discrimination.195 
Next, O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, White and Kennedy, reaffirmed a strict scrutiny 
approach to all racial classifications, based in part on a "danger of stigmatic harm", but also 
based on the perception that this 30% plan was nothing more than racial pork barren for the 
politically dominant Black majority in Richmond.196 Then, joined also by Stevens (and 
therefore comprising a majority) she found that general discrimination in the construction 
industry did not provide a compelling government reason for an explicit racial classification. 
O'Connor listed the five findings of fact that the District Court had found to justify remedial 
action:197
( I )  the ordinance declares itself to be remedial; (2) several proponents of the 
measure stated their views that there had been past discrimination in the 
construction industry; (3) minority businesses received 0.67% of prime contracts 
from the city while minorities constituted 50% of the city's population; (4) 
there were very few minority contractors in local and state contractors' 
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associations; and (5) in 1977, Congress made a determination that the effects 
of past discrimination had stifled minority participation in the construction 
industry nationally. 
She then refuted each of them, at length, showing that they were insufficient to support an 
explicit racial classification. Instead, O'Connor appeared to demand evidence of something 
"approaching a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation" by someone in the 
Richmond construction industry .198 Note that this list is not much less than Congress had in 
Fullilove when it justified the 10% set aside. So, for at least Stevens and Kennedy, and 
perhaps also for O'Connor, Rehnquist and White, there is a strong hint of a new willingness 
to examine legislative fact finding. Will this slop over to justifying minority preferences in 
broadcasting on the diversity rationale? Perhaps.199 
O'Connor's majority said the failure to find a compelling state interest made the evalua­
tion of whether the plan was narrowly tailored virtually impossible. The 30% set aside was 
related to nothing except "racial balancing", an impermissible goal. 
Justice Stevens, concurring, reaffirmed the philosophy of his own opinions in Wygant and 
Fullilove, that legislative units ought to be allowed to justify using explicit racial 
classifications by relying on forward-looking rationales, rather than just remedial ones. But in 
this case, unlike Wygant, said Stevens, no such rationale exists.200 
Kennedy, concurring in part, was openly skeptical of the argument about Section 5 of the 
1 4th Amendment giving Congress greater power to use racial classifications than the states 
have. He also expressed support for Scalia's argument, contrary to Stevens', that race may 
never be used for anything other than a remedy. 
Scalia, concurring, decried the use of race for nonremedial purposes, and almost entirely 
embraced O'Connor's theory of section 5 of the 14th Amendment to distinguish Fullilove.201 
Justice Marshall, dissenting with Brennan and Blackmun, pointed out (correctly, in my 
opinion) that the evidence of discrimination that O'Connor rejected was precisely the same 
sort of evidence that had previously been accepted. 202 The evidence of statistical disparity 
between the percentage of business going to minority contractors and the percentage of 
minority population, coupled with testimony showing disciriminatory practices in the con­
struction industry, should have been enough to show discrimination in this market, not just in 
society at large. Marshall then applied the familiar intermediate scrutiny test and found that 
eradicating the discrimination, both in remedial and prospective terms, justified the set aside 
program. The set aside was reasonably related to the goal of eradicating discrimination, and, 
like the program approved in Fullilove, contained an administrative waiver provision for 
exemptions, placed a minimal burden on white contractors (who could still compete for the 
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other 97% of business in the Richmond area), and affected no vested rights. Race-neutral 
contracting, required by law since 1975, has been totally ineffective, argued Marshall, and 
low-interest loans to small businesses have also proven useless. 203 Last, Marshall lamented 
the majority's chilly attitude toward affirmative action. In particular, the suggested 
requirement of finding a statutory or constitutional violation to justify remedial programs, the 
hint that only victims of specifically identified instances of discrimination may benefit, 204 and 
the theory that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment acts as a restraint on state power to 
remedy discrimination all represented an abandonment of prior learning and values. 
B. PULLING THE CASES TOGETHER 
Despite all of the discord in the many opinions in these four cases, we can discern some 
common themes. Virtually all of the opinions, except perhaps Chief Justice Burger's opinion in 
Fullilove, start by searching for good reasons that could justify the use of explicit racial 
quotas. Once a theoretically sufficient reason has been located, the justices check to see 
whether the specific program directly implements the reason, and does so at a low enough 
cost. The major differences in applying the general approach begin to surface in the two 
competing verbal formulations: "strict . scrutiny" requires all explicit racial classifications to 
further a "compelling state interest" in a "narrowly tailored" manner. "intermediate scrutiny" 
requires affirmative action programs to serve "important governmental objectives" in a manner 
"substantially related" to those objectives. 
I. What "Counts" as a Good Reason for Affirmative Action Programs? 
a. Remedying Societal Discrimination
The broadest argument for affirmative action programs is that racial discrimination in
society at large handicaps minority group members' attempts to involve themselves in all 
aspects of life. To remedy this unfair handicap, the government may use explicit racial 
classifications wherever a substantial disparity exists between the percentage of minorities in 
the population and the percentage of minorities in particular businesses, educational 
institutions, and so forth. This argument got only four votes in Bakke,205 and has not done 
as well since that time. The opinions in Wygant and Croson now strongly suggest that only 
three justices -- Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun -- accept this rationale as applied to state 
and local governments. In fact, the Wygant and Croson opinions rejecting those programs 
were so strident that I suspect that almost no reason will justify affirmative action at the 
state and local level. The arguments of O'Connor, Rehnquist, White and Scalia in Croson that 
under section 5 of the 14th Amendment the federal government has greater powers than the 
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states to remedy racial discrimination, however, may give some breathing room for this 
rationale in federal programs. 
b. Remedying effects of discrimination by nongovernmental actors in the industry. 
Remedying discrimination in the industry against minorities and women by banks, 
insurance companies, suppliers, and so forth, may provide a more solid reason for affirmative 
action programs. This rationale helped validate the program tested in Fullilove, and Justice 
O'Connor's opinion in Croson suggested that where the private discrimination had become so 
pervasive that governmental action would necesarilly participate in the discriminatory 
activities, remediation would support the constitutionality of affirmative action programs.206
c. Remedying Past Discrimination by a Governmental Unit 
All justices agree207 that a governmental unit that has discriminated in the past may
adopt race-conscious remedies to undo past harms. This is most obvious in the school 
desegregation cases, where school boards have been allowed (and even required) to assign 
students by race to undo the effects of past discrimination by the school board. But Fullilove 
also has strains of this rationale in it. 20B
d. Benefits From an Integrated Student Body
Only Justice Powell in Bakke has ever directly opined that the benefits from having an
integrated student body could justify use of race as an explicit criterion in a multicriteria 
choice process. However, there are hints from two other justices that something like Powell's 
rationale might suffice. Justice O'Connor's footnote in Wygant suggested that promoting racial 
diversity on a faculty might justify affirmative action. Justice Stevens, also in Wygant, sug­
gested that an integrated student body could be better served by an integrated faculty. 
e. Role Models
In Wygant the majority rejected the role model theory -- that Black students needed to
see and be taught by successful, smart, hard working Black teachers to know and understand 
that success was possible for them, too. 
f. Increasing Medical Service to Minority Groups 
U.C. Davis attempted to justify its admissions process on the ground that doctors who 
are members of minority groups will tend to give medical service to those minority groups. 
Although Powell seemed to accept this argument at the most theoretical level, he rejected it 
44 
as applied to U.C. Davis because the empirical relationship was unproven, and especially 
because U.C. Davis might able to pursue this goal without using explicit racial classifica­
tions.209 
2. What is a Sufficiently Direct Connection Between a Racial Classification and the Reason
for Using It?
I will not discuss in any detail the question of the direct connection between racial
classifications and the justifications therefor. This issues are highly fact-dependent and 
contextual, and are better discussed within the framework of evaluating minority preferences 
in broadcasting. In a nutshell, the court focuses on the efficacy of a particular program at 
achieving its goals, the costs in terms of both money and other goals (herein of alternatives 
less intrusive), and fairness to third parties. 
3. Application to Minority Preferences in Broadcasting
There seem to be three candidates for justifying minority preferences in broadcasting
under the equal protection component of the due process clause of the 5th Amendment. I will 
organize the discussion by justification -- remedying societal discrimination, remedying past 
discrimination by the FCC, and increasing programming service to minority groups. 
a. Remedying Societal Discrimination
The government might argue that the minority preferences in broadcasting are
constitutional because members of minority groups are discriminated against throughout 
society, in education, business and industry, and as a result suffer an unfair handicap in the 
race to own businesses. 210 To show how this argument applies to broadcasting, the 
government would present data highly analogous to that produced in Fullilove. 211 Statistics 
would show that minority group members own a much smaller percentage of broadcasting 
outlets than their percentages in the population, at large, would suggest. As I suggested 
above, a majority of the Supreme Court rejects this argument as a justification for affirmative 
action. But, as applied more specifically to the broadcasting industry, it might work. 
b. Remedying Discrimination in the Broadcasting Industry
Congress could claim that discrimination by financiers, insurance companies, studios,
independant producers, advertizing agencies, and others has reduced the rate of economic 
survival by minorities in the broadcasting industry. Data on the differential rate statistics 
could be paired with testimony on the history of discrimination in the broadcasting and 
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entertainment business, as well as in allied industries. As a result, the government would 
claim, a direct remedy of minority preferences would be needed. 
As I explained in the introduction to this article212, there are two big problems with 
applying this argument to the cases before the Supreme Court. First, the FCC has never 
claimed that this is the rationale for the minority preference policies. Second, even if the 
FCC were allowed to change its tune and try to use this remedial justification, neither 
Congress nor the Commission has ever assembled the factual record to support the 
argument. 213 In fact, at Hearings before the Telecommunications Subcommitte of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, witnesses suggested developing such a 
factual record, and offered to help do so. 214 
Judge Edwards and Judge Silberman have appraised the remedial justification for minority 
preference policies in very different fashions. In Winter Park Communications v .  FCC215,
Judge Edwards upheld the comparative hearing preference on this ground, referring to nothing 
much more than a statement in a conference report that "the effects of past inequities 
stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination . . .  " continue to plague the broadcasting 
industry.216 In contrast, Judge Silberman, concurring in Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford v. 
FCC217, found the findings constitutionally deficient to support the distress sale policy. In
particular, Judge Silberman demanded some "particularized evidence of the effects of societal 
discrimination in [broadcasting)"218. Judge Silberman cited Croson many times in his 
discussion of the evidentiary burden that must be shouldered by the legislature, and seemed 
willing to scrutinize the evidence before Congress and the FCC in some detail. Because the 
FCC has not attempted to justify the minority preference policies on this basis, it is 
unsurprising that the evidence will stand up to no searching evaluation. 
Because the FCC has not justified its minority preference policies on this remedial 
rationale, and because the relationship between ownership characteristics and programming 
choices plays no role in the rationale, I will pursue none of the subsidiary questions, such as 
the costs of each preference policy, the existence of alternatives, and fairness to third 
parties. But if the FCC were to adopt this rationale, these issues would be crucial. 
c. Remedying Past FCC Discrimination Against Minorities
Everyone agrees that if a governmental unit has discriminated against minorities, it may
lawfully use explicit racial guidelines to remedy that discrimination.219 However, the FCC has
never claimed to have discriminated in the past, and it is not clear how they would go about 
proving such a thing if they were to try to do so.220 If the FCC were subjected to nothing 
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much more searching than the Fullilove standard, it might carry its burden. Broadcast 
historians could probably be found to testify that during the 1 950s the FCC was staffed by 
right wing, racist Eisenhower appointees who would not even give licenses to rich, white 
Democrats. 221 These Commissioners, the historians would claim, would not have given the
time of day, much less a valuable broadcast license, to a minority applicant.222 During this
time the vast majority of valuable television licenses were handed out. 
On the other hand, if the FCC were to be subjected to something more analogous to the 
Croson approach, proving past discrimination would be difficult. First, I suspect that very few 
minorities applied for licenses during the 1 950s, 223 and I know of know evidence to suggest
the contrary. (This is a rational response to discrimination. Applying for a license is quite 
costly, and if the probability of getting the license is zero it is irrational to apply.) 
However, in Croson O'Connor indicates that, at a minimum, the government must compare the 
rate at which minorities applied for rights to the rate at which they were awarded to show 
discrimination. O'Connor's test would suggest that opponents of the minority preferences 
would be allowed to "explain" the lack of minority licensees by the lack of minority 
applicants, rather than by any governmental discrimination. Second, the multicriteria choice 
process used to award broadcast licenses muddies the water a great deal. Any decision to 
refuse to grant a license to a minority can be explained by other criteria in the decision. 
Assuming that past discrimination by the FCC was proved, the question would be whether 
the minority preference policies were sufficiently connected to the goal of remedying the 
discrimination.224 One possibility, suggested in Croson, is that only identified victims of
discrimination can benefit from a remedial policy. If this rule were to be extended to the 
minority preferences, then only disappointed applicants would be eligible. Because it would be 
difficult to prove discrimination in any particular case, and because probably many of the 
disappointed applicants from the 1950s have died by now, the scope of the minority preference 
policies would be drastically narrowed. 
d. Increasing Diversity in Broadcasting
The FCC has tried to justify the minority preferences in broadcasting as a means of
increasing the diversity of broadcast programming. Although the D.C. Circuit has ruled that 
this goal is a compelling state interest225, the Supreme Court has never faced the issue.
i. Diversity in Broadcasting as a Compelling State Interest
The Supreme Court--or at least some members of the Court--has passed on three
suggested compelling state interests that might be analogous: diversity in student bodies; 
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producing more medical service to minority communities; and producing role models for 
minority students.226 In the two D.C. Circuit cases that were issued this year, virtually all of 
the argumentation centered on the analogy between diversity in student bodies and diversity 
on the airwaves. Perhaps Judge Wald advanced the strongest arguments in favor of the 
analogy. She noted that the more general goal of advancing education by exposing students 
to many viewpoints is furthered by diversity in student bodies. Second, she stated that a 
great deal of learning takes place by watching and listening to broadcasts. Increasing 
diversity in broadcast offerings would therefore serve the same goal, and in the same way, as 
increasing diversity in student bodies.227 The best response to this starts by reformulating
the more general purpose served by diversity in student bodies. Justice Powell emphasized 
that a diverse student body would teach students not to be racially prejudiced and instead to 
judge individuals on their merits. The minority preferences in broadcasting would not serve 
this goal, for listeners and viewers have no idea about the race of a station's owner .228 
The other two rationales--medical service to minorities and role models for minority 
students--can produce their own arguments about analogy. I wiU neither try to resolve any of 
these arguments nor even to outline the arguments. Rather, I will assume that diversity in 
broadcasting is a compelling state interest, and then ask what else must be shown to uphold 
minority preferences in broadcasting. 
ii. The Nexus Between Ownership Characteristics and Programming
At a minimum, the government must demonstrate a nexus between ownership
characteristics and programming. In the absence of such a connection, increasing the number 
of minority licensees would be irrelevant to achieving the goal of diversity in programming. 
The government's ability to "prove" such a nexus to the court will depend upon the strictness 
with which the court will examine supporting evidence. 
The most relaxed standard grows out of Fullilove, where Chief Justice Burger allowed 
Congress to find, on a rather thin record, that low levels of federal contracting with minority 
contractors stemmed from past discrimination in the construction industry. 229 Justice Powell, 
concurring, wrote that "[aJlthough the [illegal! discriminatory activities were not identified 
with the exactitude expected in judicial or administrative adjudication."230 the discrimination
was found with enough certainty to support a Congressional statute.231 
Judge Wald, utilizing a FuUilove-like approach, has provided an extensive list of the 
"evidence" showing the nexus. She lists 1 )  The Kerner Commission's finding in 1 968 that 
nonminority ownership of the media produced a white man's view of the world in the media, 
leading to frustration and violence on the part of minorities232; 2) The 1977 finding by the 
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United States Commission on Civil Rights that "a mass medium dominated by whites will 
ultimately fail in its attempts to communicate with an audience that includes Blacks"233; 3) 
several decisions of the D.C. Circuit that were "premised on the reasonable belief that 
encouraging minority ownership can be expected to promote diversity of programming"234; 4) 
the statement in the Conference Report accompanying the 1982 lottery amendments that "the 
nexus . . .  has been repeatedly recognized"235; 5) the 1987 and 1988 appropriations riders
directing the FCC to terminate any reexamination of the minority preference policies236; 6) 
statements by the Senate Commerce Committee accompanying the appropriations rider that 
"Diversity of ownership results in diversity of programming"237; and 7) the CRS study.
Under a Fullilove type of approach, Wald's evidence should support the nexus. Note that 
most social scientists would not regard the first six items as "evidence" of any sort. The best 
way for a social scientist to understand these six things is as sources of normative direction 
to a court, informing it where to place the burden of proof, and how heavy that burden 
should be. In essence Wald is arguing (quite correctly in my opinion) that under a Fullilove 
approach the first six sources place a heavy burden on those who would disprove the nexus. 
Given such a burden, this article's analysis of the CRS study plays a crucial role. 238 I have
shown that although the CRS data might by worthless, they also might provide some s11pport 
to both the consumption and the production cost advantage theories of why increasing 
minority ownership increases minority programming. This ambiguous support for the nexus 
should be enough to sustain the nexus, given the Fullilove type of scrutiny. 
The Croson opinion suggests taking a far more skeptical approach when appraising factual 
assertions connected to explicit racial classifications. Another way of stating this is that the 
first six sources of normative direction listed by Wald would be far less important under the 
Croson ethic. Judge Williams took such an approach and, not surprisingly, found the evidence 
of a nexus wanting. The first six sources of evidence were either ignored or discounted 
because they represented mere "assertions" of a nexus, without any facts to back up the 
assertions. The CRS study came in for especially harsh treatment because of the study's 
failure to control for market demand, its lack of an objectively verifiable definition of 
minority programming, and its self-report technique.239 Under such a skeptical approach, the 
Court will fail to find the nexus and rule the minority preferences unconstitutional. 
As I noted above, 240 the choice between approach may depend in part on whether the 
Court chooses to read Croson as applying only to state and local governments. What would 
happen if the Court were take an intermediate, third path, when testing the nexus? I believe 
that Congress could pass some reformulated minority preferences, more closely tied to the 
theory presented in this paper, and survive the Court's test. The reformulated minority 
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preferences would have to provide an opportunity for a hearing at which the issue would be: 
"what is the liklihood that the exercise of a minority preference in this particular case will 
increase diversity in programming?" The parties would be allowed to present evidence on the 
factors that our theory suggested were most important: ( ! ) Is there a substantial minority 
population in this market? (2) Is the minority population currently unserved? (3) How many 
outlets are there in the market? (4) What is the cost of minority programming, vs. 
nonminority programming? and so forth. In this way, the new policy would be keyed directly 
to the theory of the market, and would need less in the way of factual support to sustain it. 
Under a level a scrutiny that is intermediate between Fullilove and Croson, these reformulated 
minority preferences might survive.241 
If I am correct, then of the four existing minority preference policies, the comparative 
hearing stands the best chance of surviving the constitutional test, for it provides the most 
opportunity for individual argument about application of the policy in each case. The distress 
sale, tax certificate, and lottery preference are far more mechanical and hence far more 
vulnerable to attack. 
e. Narrow Tailoring
Several issues routinely get discussed under the rubric of "narrow tailoring." I will
separate the discussion of each. 
i. Individual Application
Racially explicit classifications must be applied to individual cases in ways that maximize
the justification for the racial classification. One of the main arguments Justice O'Connor 
used to distinguish between Fullilove and Croson rested on the degree of matching between 
the goals of a set aside and the individual contractor's experience of discrimination. In 
Fullilove. only the costs directly attributable to past discrimination needed to be included in a 
general contractor's bid, and a hearing was available on the issue. In Croson, the O'Connor 
characterized Richmond's set aside plan as far less flexible, with no avenue for relief when a 
minority subcontractor's extra costs were neither reasonable nor due to past discrimination. 
The minority preference policies would have to pass an analogous hurdle. The 
government would have to show that the minority preference polices were applied in individual 
cases so as to maximize the increase in diversity of programming. The reformulated minority 
preference policies that I described in the section immediately above would be most likely to 
pass muster. The hearing on the liklihood of increasing diversity in the individual case would 
speak directly to Justice O'Connor's concerns in Croson. 
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ii. Nonracial Alternatives
The government must show that it tried (or at least considered) and subsequently
rejected nonracial alternative methods to increase diversity in programming. However, the 
FCC would face legal barriers to tackling the diversity in programming problem head on. 
First, section 326 of the Federal Communications Act prevents censorship by the FCC. 
Second, the First Amendment does much the same thing. There would be no barrier to using 
structural tools to increase diversity in programming. Increasing the number of outlets is the 
most obvious alternative that is suggested by the economic analysis in this paper. The FCC 
has already found, in the context of evaluating the fairness doctrine, that increasing the 
number of outlets increases diversity.242
iii. Burden on Third Parties
Policies using explicit racial classifications must not place unduly heavy burdens on
innocent nonminorities.243 This general rule produced the arguments in Wygant about whether
or not layoffs placed a much heavier burden on innocent third parties than did hiring 
policies. 244 Fullilove's set aside policies were cited as examples of policies that spread
relatively light burdens over large numbers of third parties.245
In Shurberg Judge Wald and Judge Silberman clashed over this issue. Judge Wald claimed 
that the distress sale policy spread its burdens over all nonminority applicants for broad­
casting stations in the United States. One whose bid for a station was thwarted by the 
distress sale policy could apply for another station, somewhere else. Because the distress sale 
policy is rarely applied, there are many stations left available. 246 Judge Silberman's opinion
regarded each broadcast market as unique. A disappointed claimant for a license in one 
market cannot fairly be told, according to Silberman, to take a license elsewhere. Therefore, 
the burden is great, and falls directly on the handful of applicants for a license. 247
Another aspect of whether the burden on third parties is fair is whether the government 
considers other factors -- other than race, that is -- in making its decision. The multicriteria 
choice process approved by Powell in Bakke had this feature; race was only one of many 
criteria to be taken into account. The minority preference in the comparative hearing process 
was upheld in Winter Park in part on this ground. The other distress sale policies, however, 
do not have this feature, and will probably face rougher treatment because of it. If Congress 
were to reformulate the minority preferences so as to allow a hearing that encompassed all 
elements of the public interest determination when deciding whether to apply the minority 
preference in a particular case, the preferences would be more likely to survive.248
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IV. OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have seen that the FCC has attempted to justify its minority preference policies by 
claiming that increasing minority ownership of broadcasting outlets will increase the volume of 
broadcasts targeted at minority groups. After reviewing the economic theory of broadcasting 
and the data on the connection between ownership characteristics and broadcast content, we 
saw that there could be a connection. This connection might exist either because minority 
group owners might indulge a taste for minority programming (a type of consumption 
behavior), or because minority owners have a production cost advantage in broadcasting to 
minority group members. The production cost advantage explanation is most likely for non­
English language broadcasts (usually Spanish), next most likely for African American material, 
and least likely for female-oriented programming. In addition, the explanation gains credibility 
for minority owned stations in markets where there is a large minority population, many 
competing outlets, and no competitive providers of minority programming. In sum, a social 
scientist could conclude that there is some connection between minority ownership and 
minority programming in certain types of markets. 
Next, we reviewed the cases about the Constitutionality of racial preferences, and found 
that under the most recent cases the Supreme Court has concentrated on remedial justifica­
tions for racial preferences. The remedial goal, however, probably cannot be proved suffi­
ciently under the Supreme Court's approach. The FCC has emphasized, instead, the diversity 
in broadcasting goal to justify the minority preference policies. Depending upon how one 
reads Croson, the diversity in broadcasting goal may not even be a valid justification for 
affirmative action policies. And even if diversity is a valid justification, the existing proof of 
the connection between ownership characteristics and broadcasting content will not allow a 
skeptical social scientist to conclude that minority ownership increases diversity of content, 
and may also fail to persuade the Supreme Court to uphold the minority preference policies. 
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TABLE 5 
Case Pref viewer No. of Programs offered 
number pattern distrib channels Monopoly Competition 
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2 l A 6 1 ,2 l , l , l , l , 1 ,2 
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4 2 B 3 1 ,3 1 , 1 ,2 
5 2 c 3 1 ,3,5 1 -4, each with 
7 5% probability* 
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Percentage of total audience that must be given up 
by M to show type 5 programming 
viewer preference pattern 
2 3 
26.5 3 1 .9 33.2 
22.6 26.9 30.1 
6.0 5.0 1 7.3 
TABLE 8 
Percentage of total audience that must be given up 
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viewer preference pattern 
I 2 3 
40.0 48.0 49.9 
3 1 . 1  43.5 46.8 
1 5.2 14.0 34.0 
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See B. Curtis Eaton and Richard G. Lipsey, Product Differentiation, in Handbook of 
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another. To get results, researchers frequently employ a symmetry assumption, according to 
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67. Although this measure is traditional in economic studies of markets, it is not
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Legal Concern, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 485-770 (1 980). 
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COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY (Eli Noam Ed. 
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73. Waterman, "Narrowcasting" on Cable Television: A Program Choice Model, 
Annenberg Sehl of Commun., Univ. So. Cal. (Oct. 12, 1 988). 
74. Severin Borenstein, On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Operating 
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furthest left party must be positioned at or to the left of the ideal position of the (v /m)th 
most conservative voter, and the furthest right party must be positioned at or to the right of 
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however, a station with only 1 % of the listening public gets to "keep" its audience. Cox notes 
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much better than the 1 ,077 he got for showing type I.  Once he makes the switch, 
the three broadcasters are showing 2, 3, and 4. But in this case the broadcaster 
showing type 2 can do better by showing type 1 ,  for that allows her to get 
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reorganized as a monopoly. Second, if a monopoly were to gain control of U.S. 
broadcasting, I strongly suspect it would be run by upper class white males who 
would have no interest in presenting minority interest programming, except insofar 
as broadcasts of PGA tournaments count as minority programs. 
However, I should point out that if a monopolist interested in presenting 
minority interest programming were to gain control, the monopolist could often 
satisfy his tastes at lower cost than a competitor could. For example, in case 3C, a 
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Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 1 ,  pg. 6 1 ,  
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Bell J .  Econ 74 ( 1979); Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency, 63 Am. Econ. Rev. 
1 34 ( 1973); and Simon, A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship, 1 9  
Econometrica 293 ( 1951) .  See also Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies, 2 J. L.  
Econ. & Organ. ( I  986). 
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1 0 1 .  Again, a skeptic might reply, the argument in text is irrelevant to justifying 
minority preferences in broadcasting. All a production cost advantage suggests is that 
white owners should sell stations to minority purchasers, who will be able to realize the 
increased profits from lower costs. Although the skeptic has a point, there are two 
replies that can be made. First, the minority preferences save on subsequent transaction 
costs. Second, there may be capital market imperfections that make it too costly for 
blacks to borrow money to purchase stations on the basis of asserted cost advantages. For 
an argument that capital market imperfections exist, see Report on Minority Ownership in 
Broadcasting, FCC, May 17 ,  1978, at 1 1 - 1 7; and Honig, The FCC and Its Fluctuating 
Commitment, supra note xx, at 875-76. 
102. This is not to say that the minority owner would be able to monitor his 
managers costlessly. I am only arguing that minority owners from groups that 
speak languages other than English are likely to have significantly lower costs of 
monitoring managers' performance. To the extent that a white owner speaks, for 
example, Spanish and reads La Opinion, the white owner will suffer a much smaller 
comparative disadvantage. 
1 03 .  For a review of literature confirming this, see Paule M. Poindexter and Carolyn A. 
Stroman, Blacks and Television: A Review of the Research Literature, 25 J. Bdcstg. 103, 
1 10- 1 3  {1981) .  
!04. See Dillard, J.L., Lexicon of Black English ( 1977); Folb, Edith A., Runnin' Down 
Some Lines: The Language of Black Teenagers (1980); and Smitherman,· Geneva, Talkin' ·and · 
Testifyin': The Language of Black America {1977). See also Martin Luther King Junior 
Elementary School v .  Ann Arbor School District Board, 473 F. Supp. 1371 (1979). 
105. Lower-middle and lower class blacks must be the target audience because there are so 
few blacks in the middle and upper classes. In 1987, 7.5% of American Black households 
earned incomes of $50,000 or more, as compared to 19. 7% of white households. Statistical 
Abstracts of the United States 1989, pg. 440. 
106. Dennis Hunt, Black Radio Deabates the Inclusion of White Artists, Calendar, pg.5, 
Los Angeles Times, March 26, 1989. The article contains complaints by black radio 
programmers about the need to program white artists into the schedule, and lament the loss 
of genuine black radio formats. A skeptic might interpret these complaints as the 
managers' unhappiness with the slightly reduced value of their skills at programming for a 
specialized market. On the question of Black-oriented radio and its place in the market, 
see Paul Grein, Pop Eye: Motown on the Road to a Comeback, Calendar, pg. 70, Los Angeles 
Times, July 30, 1989; and Steve Hochman, Black Rock Coalition Pushes for an End to 'Musical 
Apartheid,' Calendar, part 6, pg. 1 ,  col. I, Los Angeles Times, June 14, 1989. 
107. According to figures supplied by CBS, the ratings for the two shows were as follows: 
CAGNEY & LACEY 
Women 1 8+ Men 18+ 
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TV SEASON Rtg Sh Rtg (000) % Dist Rtg (000) % Dist 
1 981 -82 1 5.2 24 12.3 10,380 53.I 9.7 7,360 37.6 
1982-83 1 5.2 24 1 1 .3 9,780 52.0 9.0 6,980 37.1 
1 983-84 20.9 36 16.3 14,270 55.7 12.0 9,460 36.9 
1984-85 1 6.9 28 1 3.6 12,050 58.0 8.8 6,990 33.6 
1 985-86 16.7 27 1 3.6 12,160 57.9 8.6 6,960 33.2 
1 986-87 1 5. 1  24 12 . 1  1 1 ,0 I O  59.8 7.4 5,488 32.9 
1 987-88 1 3.0 22 10.7 9,868 57.7 6.6 5,488 32. I
Source: NTI 
KATE & ALLIE 
Women 1 8+ Men 18+ 
TV SEASON Rtg Sh Rtg (000) % Dist Rtg (000) % Dist 
1 983-84 2 1 .9 33 18.2 15,910 52.6 1 1 .7 9,240 30.6 
1983-85 1 8.3 27 1 4.9 1 3,220 52.4 9.3 7,400 29.3 
1 985-86 20.0 29 1 6.7 14,980 5 1 .7 IO . I  8,140 28. l
1 986-87 1 8.3 27 1 5.9  14,480 53.4 8.9 7,290 26.9 
1 987-88 14.7 22 12.3 1 1 ,295 55.6 7.5 6,198 30.5 
1 988-89 1 3 . I  20 10.8 I 0, 1 13 56.8 6.8 5,715  32. I
Source: NTI 
UNIVERSES 
TV SEASON HOUSEHOLDS WOMEN 1 8+ MEN 
1 8+ 
(000) (000) (000) 
1 981 -82 81 ,500 84,720 76,140 
1 982-83 83,300 86,350 77,770 
1983-84 83,800 87,480 78,870 
1 984-85 84,900 88,570 79,850 
1 985-86 85,900 89,560 80,800 
1 986-87 87,400 90,830 81 ,980 
1 987-88 88,600 91 ,900 82,980 
1 988-89 90,400 93,4 1 0  84,470 
Source: NTI 
I 08. This does not preclude, of course, the possibility that many women might 
have a strong taste for broadcasting to other women. 
109. See Program Policy Statement (Network Programming Inquiry), 25 Fed. Reg. 7291 
( 1960)(requiring programming in 14 different categories, including programs for children, 
religious programs, educational programs, public affairs, editorials, politics, 
agriculture, news, weather, sports, minority programming, local self-expression, programs 
with local talent, and entertainment). 
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1 10. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council against Television Station WTVH 
Syracuse, New York, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. 5043 ( 1987). 
1 1 1 . Two of the witnesses at the Senate hearings in September of 1989 urged arguments 
something like this upon the Subcommittee on Telecommunications. See Testimony of John 
Payton at 29-30; Address of Mr. Percy E. Sutton at 2 - 5. 
This should not be confused with the related argument that although women do not all 
think alike about controversial issues, women are much more likely than men to agree that 
some issues are important and deserve to be treated. See Lieby, The Female Merit Policy, 
supra note xx, at 406. This argument does suggest that women owners will program very 
different material than will men. 
1 12. The analysis would likely depend upon the relative income levels of those in each of the 
groups. My guess is that the lower the relative income of a listener or viewer, the higher 
the tolerance for commercial announcements, and the more likely that group is to provide 
demand for over-the-air programming. Of course, the lower the income the Jess desirable is 
the group as a target audience. As applied to ethnic groups, my guess is that blacks, one of 
the poorest groups in the United States, would tend to substitute away from commercial 
broadcast far less than would Asians, one of the richest groups in the United States. 
I I  3. Lawrence Soley and George Hough III, Black Ownership of Commercial Radio 
Stations: An Economic Evaluation, 22 J. Bdcstg. 455 ( 1 978). 
1 14. There was only one black-owned television station in the U.S. Id. 458. 
1 1 5. taken from id. at 459. 
1 16. Id. 461 .  
I 1 7 .  Loy A .  Singleton, FCC Minority Ownership Policy and Non-Entertainment 
Programming in Black-Oriented Radio Stations, 25 J. Bdcstg. 195 ( 1 98 1 ). 
1 18 .  Singleton's most egregious error was his decision to locate all black-oriented radio 
stations, determine the race of the owners, and then compare the actions of black and white 
owners who were broadcasting to blacks. This is wildly inappropriate when trying to evaluate 
a policy that first picks an owner by race and then hopes for differential programming output. 
To see this, just note that if black owners were far more likely than white owners to program 
for blacks, then even if black and white owners who chose to program for blacks were to 
provide equal levels of public service programming, awarding a license to a black instead of a 
white would, other things being equal, tend to provide more public service programming to the 
black community. In effect, Singleton got the causation element of the minority preference 
policies backwards. 
Singleton should have located all black owners and then asked how much community 
service programming the black owners provide to the black community, as compared with 
whites. Even this data might, however, fail to have much value. The ability of Black owners 
to choose the locale of purchased stations might alter the analysis. After all, if Black owners 
were to choose to purchase stations in areas with large (relatively underserved) Black 
70 
populations, then maybe the market demand, and not Black owners' bountiful supply, would 
explain the tendency of Blacks to program for blacks. But this argument would only make a 
difference if Black owners were to purchase stations in areas with large black populations for 
reasons unrelated to the Black owners' lower costs of targeting a Black audience or special 
desire to serve a Black audience. For example, if Black owners were to purchase stations 
with an eye toward personally running the station and also being able to frequently socialize 
with many Black friends, the Black owners' choice might dictate location, and the location 
would dectate the target audience. In this way we might observer Black owners programming 
for Black audiences far more often than non-Black owners, but no cost advantage or desire to 
serve Black audiences would be present. On the other hand, if Black owners were to purchase 
stations in areas with large Black audiences so as to take advantage of lower costs or special 
desires to serve Black audiences, then the location would be the effect, rather than the 
cause. It would be hard to know, just from staring at the data, which scenario was correct. 
1 19. Jorge Reina Schement and Loy A. Singleton, The Onus of Minority Ownership: FCC 
Policy and Spanish-Language Radio, 3 1  J. Communication 78 ( 198 1 ). 
120. Schement and Singleton use a research design similar to that used by Singleton, but 
avoid drawing inappropriate policy conclusions therefrom. Schement and Singleton suggest 
that it may be inappropriate to expect Latino owners who choose to program in Spanish to 
provide significantly more public service programming than do white owners who program in 
Spanish. 
1 2 1 .  Study of this quite current data set is crucial for the case of black oriented 
radio because of the upheavals in the market since the late 1970s. During that 
period the disco craze took hold, and many white listeners were attracted to 
formerly all black audiences. When disco died, the Urban Contemporary format was 
created. U /C tends to attract a multi-ethnic audience, with roughly similar numbers 
of black and white listeners. As a result, the remaining audience for strictly black 
formats has been reduced. See Michael C. Keith, Radio Programming: Consultancy 
and Formatics 165-66 ( 1987). 
122. The questionaire also asked about other things, such as degree of integration of 
ownership into management. The items listed in text are those of central importance to our 
inquiry, however. 
123. The statement in text may be a bit too strong. There is a very strong argument that 
Joint Resolution 395 was unconstitutional. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation 
Clause, 77 Georgetown L.J. 2079 ( 1989). Perhaps I should say that the FCC chose to terminate 
the inquiry. 
1 24. CRS study, pgs 2-3. 
125. The la.rge markets were New York, NY; Dallas, TX; Los ,A,.ngeles, C1\.; Chicago, 
IL; Atlanta, GA. CRS study, page 3 .  
7 1  
1 26. The five small markets were Flagstaff, AZ; Elmira, NY; Meridian, Miss.; Butte, 
Montana; and Lacrosse, Wisconsin. CRS study, page 3. 
1 27. The CRS study cautions, at page 3, against leaning very hard on its conclusions 
precisely because they have no firm handle on separating these effects. 
1 28. Derived from CRS study, page 9. 
1 29. Derived from CRS study, page 14. 
The opposite trend in broadcasting to other ethnic groups is observed for stations with 
less than 51  % minority ownership. 
TABLE 1 3  
Percent of Station In (<51 % )  Ownership Groups 











Broadcasting stations with less than 51  % black ownership are more likely to broadcast to 
other ethnic groups. This sort of data is not particularly helpful for several reasons. First, 
there is no . breakdown according to how large a percentage these owners had; or the· nature 
of the other owners. If many of the stations that had small percentage of black ownership 
also had less than 5 1  % ownership interests by other ethnics, this could explain some of these 
results. Second, the economic models I presented were constructed to explain the 
programming choices of minorities who controlled the broadcasting stations -- in effect 51% or 
more owners. For these reasons, I will concentrate on the data from the stations that are 
owned by minorities and women. 
1 30 .  See Broadcasting Television & Cable Factbook, A- 1 3  ( 1 987). 
1 3  I .  Soley and Hough, supra note xx. 
1 32. I also have no a priori expectations as to whether white male owners would 
target white males. 
1 33.  The CRS study also looked at the type and quantity of minority interest 
programming by various owner groups. Was the programming regularly scheduled, or 
was it specially programming? Did the owner provide more than or less than 20 
hours per week of minority interest programming? The statistical results conform 
to those described in the text. See CRS study, supra note xx, at 27 - 36. 
The CRS study also examined separately stations reporting that their owners 
participated in management. The CRS found that stations "with black, Hispanic and 
A_sian/Pacific manager-owners had a higher percentage programming for their own 
minority audience group and lower percentages for other minority groups." CRS 
study, supra note xx, at 40. This is consistent with both the taste and monitoring 
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cost advantage hypotheses. An owner who managed his station might satisfy his 
tastes more frequently at lower cost. Similarly, an owner-manager would be in the 
best position to utilize his monitoring cost advantage, for he would have personal 
knowledge of the day-to-day operations. 
1 34. The CRS study used data on stations with less than 51  % minority ownership interests 
and found large, unexplained differences between national patterns and those found in small 
markets. This reinforces my decision only to use data from stations where minorities hold 
ownership interests of greater than 50%. 
1 35 .  CRS study, supra note xx, at 25. 
1 36. Regarding Urban Contemporary, see Michael C. Keith, Radio Programming: Consultancy 
and Formatics, 147 ( 1987). 
Some sample radio demographics: 
KGFJ (930-9090) 
L.A. radio station classified as "black" by Arbitron. 
Listener's demographics (as supplied by station) 
Age: 25 - 54 
Male/Female ratio - 50/50 
Race percentiles -
Black - 70% 
Hispanic - 20% 
Other - 10% 
Station is both, owned and managed by minorities 
KKGO (478-5540) 
L.A. radio station, formerly Jazz, now Jazz and Classical. 
Listener's demograohics (as supplied by station. for Jazz format) 
Age: 25 - 54 
Male/Female: 50/50 
Income: $75,000 (professional types) 
Race -
White - 75% 
Black - 20% 
Other - 5% 
Station representative said that they expect the demographics that represent the new format 
to be similar though they do expect to lose some of the Black and Hispanic audience. 
Station is managed by minorities, Black, Hispanic, Filipino. 
WBGO (201 -624-8880) 






White - 50% 
Black - 25% 
Latino - 25% 
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No significant minority ownership nor mangement. 
KKSF 






White - 80% 
Black - 10% 
Hispanic - 4% 
Other - 6% 
No significant minority ownership nor management. 
KBLX (415-848-7713) 






White - 50% 
Black - 40% 
Other - 1 0% 
Station is minority owned but not operated. 
KJAZ (415-769-4800) 






White - 75% 
Black - 16% 
Hispanice - 4% 
Other - 5% 
Not owned or managed by minorities (formerly owned in partnership w /Lionel Wilson, mayor of 
Oakland (Black) but he was bought out 8 years ago. 
Demographic information based on survey that station did. One thousand questionnaires sent 
out, 720 returned and usable. 
KLON (985-5566) 






White - 1/3 
Black - 1/3 
Other - 1/3 
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Station owned by Cal State Long Beach. Upper management mostly white. 
WBEZ 




Income: $40,000 - $75,000 
Race -
White - 9 I .9% 
Black - 8.1% 
License held by Chicago Board of Ed.; general superintendant of schools and president of Bd. 
of Ed. black. Significant minority management, news director, black woman, station manager, 
white woman. 
WQCD 
NY jazz contemporary station 







White - 45% 
Black - 45% 
Hispanic - I 0% 
Owned by Tribune Corp. No significant minority management. 
1 37. In addition, there is the possibility, explained in note I 15,  supra, that minority owners' 
choice of station location was determined by social factors, and that location determined 
broadcast content. Hence, the data would be worthless for appraising a policy that just 
targets minority owners' characteristics, rather than station location. 
1 38.  I must issue a word of caution about the application of these cases to broadcasting. All 
four of these cases deal with the allocation of jobs or job training. The minority preference 
policies, however, goven allocation of a productive asset (the right to use the electromagnetic 
spectrum). Affirmative action programs for jobs implicate issues of personhood and 
stigmatization that are fundamentally missing from the minority preference policies in 
broadcasting. This difference might change the outcome of some cases. 
The correlation between affirmative action programs and human capital has been so high 
that the Supreme Court's cases evaluating race-based employment plans under Title VII have 
been discussed in law review articles evaluating the Constitutional law of affirmative action. 
See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of 
Constitutional Equality, 87 Mich. L. Rev. I 729, 1 735 n.27 ( 1989); and Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 1 00 Harv. L. Rev. 78 ( 1986). 
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1 39. A thorough evaluation of racial preferences requires subtle and complex normative, 
political, historical, economic and psychological arguments. For a good discussion of many of 
these issues, see Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 723 { 1974); Thomas Sowell, Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality? ( 1984) Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Since of Discrimination, supra note xx; Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke,: Equal Protection, 
Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice?, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 864 (1979); Kennedy, Persuasion 
and Distrust A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327 ( 1986); 
Days, Fullilove, 96 Yale L. J. 453 (1987) [and others]. For a public choice theoretic analysis 
of Bakke, see Spitzer. 
I have no such grand ambitions for this article. Instead, I review the cases in text only 
to establish the directions in which Supreme Court jurisprudence has been evolving, with an 
eye focussed on the utility of data connecting minority ownership of broadcasting stations 
with minority programming in any upcoming Supreme Court test of the minority preference 
policies. 
1 40. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Fullilove v. 
K!utznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986); and 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 57 U.S.L.W. 4 1 32 ( 1 989). 
14 1 .  438 U.S. 265 ( 1978). 
142. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 300-05 ( 1978). 
143. Id. af306. 
144. Id. at 3 10-1  I .
1 45. Id. at 3 1 7. 
146. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens, found that Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made the U.C. Davis plan illegal, and did not reach the 
Constitutional issue. 
147. Id. at 359 (quoting Califano v. Webster quoting Craig v. Boren.) 
148. Id. at 362, 
149. Id. at 366-67. 
150. Id. at 370-71 .  
15 1 .  Id. 
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1 52. Id. at 376-77. The argument, now commonly accepted, that such programs stigmatize 
those minority applicants who would have qualified for admission without any such program, 
was turned away with some rather ham-fisted rhetoric: 
Once admitted, these [minority] students must satisfy the same degree requirements 
as regularly admitted students; they are taught by the same faculty in the same 
classes; and their performance is evaluated by the same standards by which 
regularly admitted students are judged. Under these circumstances, their 
performance and degrees must be regarded equally with the regularly admitted 
students with whom they compete for standing. Since minority graduates cannot 
justifiably be regarded as less well qualified than nonminority graduates by virtue of 
the special admissions program, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that 
minority graduates at schools using such programs would be stigmatized as inferior 
by the existence of such programs. 
Id. at 377. 
153. Id. at 377. Brennan also rejected Powell's approach of requiring that race be used in a 
multicriteria choice process. Such a process, said Brennan, would inevitably work just like the 
U.C. Davis program. Id. at 378-79. 
1 54. 448 U.S. 448 ( 1979). 
1 55. Pub.L. 95-28, 9 1  Stat. 1 16. 
1 56. That section read: 
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall be 
made under this Act for any local public works project unless the applicant gives 
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least I 0 per centum of the amount of 
each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises. For purposes of this 
paragraph, the term 'minority business enterprise' means a business at least 50 per 
centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned 
business, at least 5 1  per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority group 
members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are 
citizens of the United States who are negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, 
Eskimos, and Aleuts. 





1 6 1 .  
162. 
448 U.S. 448, 455. 
Id. at 458. 
Id. at 460. 
Id. at 462-67. 
U.S. Const, Art I, sec. 8, c!. 
448 U.S. 448, 474-75. 
! .  
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163. Id. at 478. 
164. Id. at 479-80. 
165. Id. at 492. 
166. Burger also made following arguments: { I )  when acting to remedy past discrimination, 
Congress need not act in a "color-blind" fashion; (2) the relatively light burden, shared by 
nonminority firms, of not getting a few contracts, does not render the MBE provision illegal; 
(3) the underinclusiveness of the MBE program -- its failure to include llYfilY firm owned by a 
disadvantaged person -- doe not render it illegal. Congress may, but need not, extend the 
MBE provision in this fashion. 
1 67. Id. at 487. 
168. Id. 
1 69. Id. 497. 
1 70. Id. 502-03. 
17 1.  Id. at 506 (emphasis aclclecl).
1 72. Powell also emphasized that the set-aside figure of I 0% rested comfortably within the 
region between the percentage of minority contractors (4%) and the minority percentage of the 
population ( 1 7%) in the USA. Id. 5 13. Also, this remedy does not fall so forcefully upon 
innocent third parties as to render it invalid. Id. 514-15.  
1 73 .  Id.  519.  
1 74. Id. 527-28. 
175.  Justice Stevens also dissented and wrote at length about his desire to review 
Congressional procedures, including the lack of fact finding before passage. In addition he 
argued that the MBE provision cannot be justified as an attempt to provide reparations to the 
entire classes of people (black, Hispanic, etc.) named there, because the benefits would not be 
distributed evenly. Next, he claimed, the MBE provision is not a remedy for past 
discrimination against minority contractors, because the legislative history is insufficient on 
this point. Id. 539-41 .  Third, he dismissed any claims to a "piece of the action", by powerful 
Congressmen. Id. 541 -42. Last, he rejected bringing more MBEs into the economy as a 
justification because the MBE provision was not narrowly tailored and was unlikely to work. 
1 711 t17h T T � '"Jh7 / 1 021;.\ 
• •  �- • •  v ....... . ..... .... ..,, ' , ... .. .... -...., . 
1 77. The clause in question read: 
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In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers through 
layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the district 
shall be retained, except that at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority 
personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the 
time of the layoff. In no event will the number given notice of possible layoff be 
greater than the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher so affected will be 
called back in reverese order for positdions for which he is certificated maintaining the 
above minority balance. 
476 U.S. 267, 270-71 .  
1 78 .  Id. 272. 
1 79. Id. 274. 
1 80. IQ. 275-76. This appears to be a complete misreading of the argument. Just because 
the role model argument might justify retaining some black teachers doesn't mean that it 
could justify firing or refusing to hire them. Justice Marshall, in dissent, picked up this point. 
1 8 1 .  Id. 277. 
182. Id. at 279. Justice O'Connor did not join in this portion of the opinion. 
1 83. Id. at 283-84. 
184. Id. at 288, n.*. 
185.  Id. at 301 -02. Marshall had previously suggested that the case was not in a proper 
condition for decision, and that a remand was in order. Id. at 296. 
186. Id. at 3 10-1  I .  
1 87. Id. at 3 16. 
188. Law, that is, in Oliver Wendell Holmes' formulation as a prediction of what courts will 
do. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 1 0  Harv. L. Rev. 457, 457 (1 897). 
1 89. 57 U.S.L.W. 4 1 32 (Jan. 24, 1 989). 
1 90. An MBE was one owned or controlled at least 51% by minority group members. A 
minority was defined as "{c]itizens of the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, 
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." 57 U.S.L.W. 41 32, 4134. 
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1 9 1 .  Id. at 4 1 35. 
1 92. The rule provided: 
No partial or complete waiver of the foregoing requirement shall be granted by the 
city other than in exceptional circumstances. To justify a waiver, it must be shown that 
every feasible attempt has been made to comply, and it must be demonstrated that 
sufficient, relevant, qualified Minority Business Enterprises . . .  are unavailable or 
unwilling to participate in the contract to enable meeting the 30% MBE goal. 
57 U.S.L.W. at 4134-35. 
193. O'Connor points out that "[t]he principal opinion in Fullilove, written by Chief Justice 
Burger, did not employ "strict scrutiny" or any other traditional standard of equal protection 
review." Id. at 4 1 37. 
1 94. The 14th Amendment reads, in part: 
Section I .  . . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
* * * 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
1 95. Id. at 4 1 38.  
1 96. "In this case, blacks comprise approximately 50% of the population of the city of 
Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the City Council are held by blacks." Id. at 4 1 39 .  
197 .  Id. at 4140. 
1 98. Id. at 4140. 
1 99. There is, simultaneously, a trend of reducing the scope of federal civil rights laws. See 
Martin v. Wilks, 57 U.S.L.W. 4616 (1989)(allowing litigation of racially explicit consent decrees 
designed to remedy past discrimination, where litigants were not parties to original action); 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 57 U.S.L.W. 4705 ( 1989)(refusing to apply 42 U.S.C. sec. 
1 98 1  to employer conduct after the formation of the employment contract); and Wards Cove 
Packing Company v .  Atonio, 57 U.S.L.W. 4583 ( 1989)(requiring plaintiffs to shoulder heavier 
burdens when proving a "disparate-impact" case under Title VII). 
200. Id. at 4143-45. 





Id. at 4146-47. 
Id. at 4 148-49. 
Id. at 41 54. 
Id. at 41 56, n.12.  
cite 
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206. If the city could show that it had essentially become a "passive participant" in a system 
of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry, we think it clear 
that the city could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system. It is beyond dispute 
that any public entity, state or federal, has a compelling interest in assuring that public 
dollars, drawn from the tax contributions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of 
private prejudice. 
1 09 S. Ct. at 720. 
See also Rosenfeld's discussion in Decoding Richmond, supra note xx, at 1 7 5 1 .  
207. Except, maybe, Scalia. See Croson, at xx. 
208 . . .  As Michel Rosenfeld describes in Decoding Richmond; supra note xx, at 175l, there are 
several models of permissible remedies in this area. The most restrictive requires actual 
injurors to help actual victims. Other models allow some slippage between the set of actual 
injurors and those who provide the help to victims, or some slippage between the set of 
actual victims and those who receive the help. If we allow a great deal of slippage within 
both the injuror and victim sets, we reinvent something like the remedy of general societal discrimin 
209. Bakke at 3 1 0- 1 1 . 
2 1 0. It seems fairly clear that neither the FCC nor Congress has relied, yet, on remedial 
justifications to support the minority preferences. See Judge Wald's dissent in Shurberg, supra 
note xx, at 168-69. 
2 1 1 .  Although the FCC has never claimed that this is the reason for the minority preference 
policies, the general case is so easy to make in almost any industry, and the factual support 
so amorphous, that I will presume that a favorably disposed court would consider the 
justification at any time. 
212 .  See page xx, supra. 
2 1 3. Indeed, Judge Williams, dissenting in Winter Park, has suggested remanding the entire 
case to the FCC to allow it to consider and take evidence on this rationale. Winter Park, 
supra note xx, at 27. 
Note that there are interesting issues as to whether Congress might need a less extensive 
factual record than would the FCC. 
8 1  
214. Testimony of John Payton Before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation, Communications Subcommittee, September 15, 1989; Statement of 
James L. Winston, Executive Director & General Counsel of The National Association of Black 
Owned Broadcasters before the Subcommitte on Communications of the United States Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, September 15 ,  1 989 (offering to help 
assemble a factual record); and Address of Mr. Percy E. Sutton before id., September 1 5, 1989. 
215.  1989 U.S. App. Lexis 5377 (April 21,  1 989); 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert granted 
216.  Id. at 16.  
217 .  1 989 U.S. App. Lexis 4582 (March 31 ,  1 989); 
218 .  Id. at 44. 
F.2d ( 1989). 
2 1 9. There are hints in Croson that only proven victims of the past discrimination may 
receive the redial rights. 
220. In the testimony at the Senate hearings, only one person even mentioned the possibility 
that the FCC had been guilty of discrimination, and he said that he knew of no evidence to 
support such an aliegation. See Testimony of Allan Shurberg, supra note xx. 
221 .  Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chandellor's Foot, 47 Geo. L.J. 655, 690-94 
( 1959). 
222. I have no clue as to the sources upon which they might rely. I made a first pass at 
the historical sources and found no direct evidence of racism on the part of Federal 
Communications Commissioners. 
223. I have found no historical evidence upon this point. 
224. Judge MacKinnon found the distress sale policy wanting because it was unconnected to 
the remedial goal. Shurberg, supra note xx, at yy. 
225. West Michigan, supra note xx, at yy. 
226. See TANS xx through yy, supra. 
227. Wald dissent at Lexis pg. 136 
228. See Williams opinion in Winter Park at Lexis pgs. 30-32. There are subsidiary arguments 
on this issue, such as whether the FCC findings that the market provides sufficient diversity 
to repeal the fairness doctrine should defeat any attempt to justify the minority preference 
policies as increasing diversity. See Wald in Shurberg at Lexis pg. xx and Silberman in 
Shurberg at Lexis pg. yy. 
229. See TAN xx. 
230. Id. at 506 (emphasis added). 
82 
231 .  Powell also emphasized that the set-aside figure of 10% rested comfortably within the 
region between the percentage of minority contractors (4%) and the minority percentage of the 
population ( I  7%) in the USA. Id. 513 .  Also, this remedy does not fall so forcefully upon 
innocent third parties as to render it invalid. Id. 514- 1 5. 
232. Wald at Lexis 142. 
233. Wald at Lexis 142. 
234. Wald at Lexis 143. 
235. Wald at Lexis 143. 
236. Wald at Lexis 144. See also statement of Sen. Ernest Hollings, Congression Record - ­
Senate, July 27, 1988, SJ  0021. 
237. Wald at Lexis 144-45. 
238. Judge MacKinnon, in Winter Park, found the burden of proof so heavy from 
Congressional findings that he refused to visit the evidence, at all. In essence, the nexus was 
established as a matter of law, not as a matter of fact, for MacKinnon. 
239. Williams at Lexis 42-44. See also id. at 45, where Williams explicitly cites Croson for 
the appropriate evidentiary standard. 
240. See TAN xx. 
241. This is, in essence, the FCC position that was rejected in TV9. 
There is one fascinating, subsidiary issue. If the revised minority preference policies 
were to be adopted by rulemaking proceedings by the FCC (perhaps pursuant to rather specific 
directions from Congress to hold rulemaking proceedings), would the Court apply the same 
level of scrutiny to factual findings by the FCC as by the Congress? The hints in previous 
cases suggest that the answer is "no"--that the FCC findings will be subject to stricter scrutiny. 
242. Even if that alternative were to fail, and some racially explicit classification were 
needed, the government might be required to try some less intrusive policy. In particular, the 
Minority Task Force report in 1978 indicated that the two biggest problems preventing 
minority purchase of broadcasting stations were the lack of information about stations for 
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sale, and the lack of adequate financing. The Congress might be required to try remedying 
these two problems, first. 
243. 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1848, 1854 ( 1986); 476 U.S. 265, 276, 287 ( 1986). 
244. 106 S.Ct. 1842, 185 1 -52 (1986); and 476 U.S. 265, 282-84 ( 1986). 
245. 106 S.Ct. at 1 861 -62; 476 U.S. at 302. 
246. Wald, at Lexis pg. 1 59. 
247. Silberman at Lexis pg. 99 (approx). 
248. Of course the cost of running such a hearing in each case might make this a very bad 
idea. 
